China’s Market Participation: The Case for a Paradigm Shift in Analyzing China’s Capital Market Regulation by Finn, David P
1CHINA’S MARKET PARTICIPATION: THE CASE FOR A 
PARADIGM SHIFT IN ANALYZING CHINA’S CAPTIAL 
MARKET REGULATION 
 
By David Finn 
 
Summer 2006 
 
2TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
PART I: CURRENT PARADIGM AND MOTIVATIONS 
A: Current Paradigm 
B: The Motivation for Legal Reforms 
 i. The Need for Money 
 ii. Maintaining Power Through Markets 
 
PART II: DEVELOPMENT, REFORM, AND ACTIONS OF CHINA’S MARKET 
ECONOMY 
A: China’s Market Hybrid 
B: Development of China’s Capital Market 
 i. The CSRC 
C: State Assets in Chinese Capital Markets 
 i. State Owned Enterprises 
 ii. SASAC 
D: Recent Securities Market Reforms  
 i. Classification of Stocks 
 ii. Split Share Reform 
E: China’s Power in the International Market and Use Thereof 
 i. China Deals with Iran 
 ii China Deals with Sudan 
 iii. China Attempts to Deal with the US: Unocal 
 
PART III: LAWS AFFECTING INVESTMENT IN CHINA’S DOMESTIC MARKETS 
A: Structure of Government Under Constitution 
B: Chinese Courts 
C: Insider Trading and Market Manipulation 
D: Fiduciary Duties 
 i. The Code of Corporate Governance  
E: Private Securities Litigation  
 i. PSL and Insider Information 
 ii. PSL and the Government Enabling Requirement 
F: Laws Governing SOE’s in the Market 
 i. Legal Basis for State Ownership 
 ii. Laws Affecting State Owned Assets 
 iii. SASAC as Investor 
 iv. SASAC as More Than Investor 
G: WTO Rules on Subsidies  
 
3PART IV: Towards a New Paradigm and Its Implications 
A: Application of Facts and Law 
 i. China’s Domestic Securities Markets 
 a. Classification of Stocks 
 b. Split Share Reform 
 c. CSRC 
 d. SASAC 
 e. Courts  
 f. The Torts 
 1. Duty of Care 
 2. Insider Information  
 ii. WTO 
B: New Paradigm 
C: Suggestions Based on New Paradigm  
CONCLUSION  
 
4INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that all the counties of the world are personified and sitting in a dark 
room. They don’t know who each other is, but they still regularly interact, such as when 
they trade goods and fight. The wealthy nations are fairly familiar with each other and 
frequently trade with each other. However, recently, someone in the room who they are 
un-familiar with has begun trading with the others much more frequently and is getting to 
be as wealthy as the other wealthy nations. They notice this nation trades with the others 
in a more restrictive fashion. The wealthier nations are becoming a little concerned 
because the new guy is taking away some of their trading advantages. In addition, it is 
trading with people that the wealthier nations don’t like and would prefer not be traded 
with. They observe the new guy growing more and more successful. The wealthy nations 
naturally would really like to know what this new guy has planned. Doesn’t he care about 
not trading with the bad guys? Why is he so restrictive with his trading? How is he 
getting so successful?  
If ever the lights were to come on, the wealthy nations would recognize the new 
guy as China. However, their questions and concerns about China would remain as in the 
darkness, for China is an enigma. It is an enigma that is becoming increasingly important 
in the modern ‘flat world’.1
China is following a unique path to development. Inspired by the 
communist/socialist philosophies of Karl Marx and Lenin, China along with the USSR, 
emerged though revolution in the middle of the 20th Century. China watched as its former 
 
1 The term ‘flat world’ is a reference to, THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2006). In which the 
author discusses the increasing competitiveness of modern businesses due to the effects of globalization 
and technology. In particular the author develops the thesis that emerging powers like China are becoming 
increasing important due to factors such as outsourcing and global supply chains. 
5comrade, the USSR, rapidly instituted democracy and free capitalism and thereafter 
immediately collapsed economically. China thus learned a valuable lesson and has 
instituted its economic reforms through much more gradual and controlled measures.  
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the very nature of some of these 
reforms. In particular it focuses on Chinese domestic capital markets2, how the 
government and State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s)3 interact within the market, and how 
this affects fairness and equality within both the domestic and international markets.  
It may safely be assumed that the Chinese government is in control of its own 
economic development. Therefore, the perceived regulatory inadequacies in the Chinese 
capital markets may have a purpose unique to the Chinese government. The paper puts 
forth the proposition that the reason the Chinese government is not regulating some 
aspects of its capital markets after Western markets is because it realizes a benefit for the 
government in those inadequacies.  
In Part I the current paradigm for analyzing China’s capital market reform is 
critically evaluated and China’s overall motivations in capital market reform are 
discussed. Part II is about the development and nature of Chinese capital markets. This 
part also looks at state ownership, new regulatory bodies and reforms, and recent 
international trade issues potentially affecting China’s capital markets.  
Part III goes into detail concerning a number of specific legal issues in China 
affecting their capital markets. In particular laws affecting fiduciary duties, insider 
 
2 Capital markets are intended to mean the domestic stock exchanges on mainland China, excluding Hong 
Kong and Taiwan due to their unique historical and legal developments. 
3 SOE’s can refer to a wide variety of business organizations in mainland China, See generally  Cindy 
Schipani and Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 
16-24 (2002) (these include closely held corporations, wholly state-owned corporations, foreign-invested 
corporations, Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures, Chinese-Foreign Contratual Joint Ventures, etc). For 
the purposes of this article the terms SOE is meant to refer generically to enterprises in China in which the 
Chinese government owns a substantial amount. 
6trading, private securities litigation, and the WTO are analyzed. Part III begins with an 
overview of the structure of the government in China in order to put the legal system and 
accountability of its regulatory bodies in context.  
Part IV critically looks at the deficiencies in laws governing Chinese capital 
markets and how these deficiencies might actually benefit the government. This leads to 
the development of a new paradigm for analyzing Chinese capital market reforms. 
Finally a few meager suggestions are offering in the context of this new paradigm to 
demonstrate how using the new paradigm could effect critical legal evaluation of China’s 
capital markets.  
 
PART I: Current Paradigm and Motivations 
 Part I examines the current paradigm with which Western scholars examine 
Chinese legal reforms. Generally the current paradigm is ineffective for several reasons 
which the following section will briefly discuss. In light of the ineffectiveness of the 
current paradigm some basic motivating factors behind China’s reform measures are 
looked into.  
Part IA: Current Paradigm 
In order to better understand Chinese economic development it may be useful to 
reexamine the largely dominant paradigm of many western scholars who examine the 
Chinese economy.4 The dominant paradigm of legal scholars refers to their shared 
 
4 In general, a dominant paradigm refers to the basic accepted beliefs or model held by those examining a 
certain condition or event. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
(3rd ed. 1996).   
7understanding of basic theories and concepts, the common language which they use, and 
their common methodology”.5 In other words they share a common ‘legal culture’.6
Western legal scholars who examine the Chinese economy tend to hold a certain 
dominant paradigm which Donald Clarke calls the Ideal Western Legal Order (IWLO).7
They then use a reductive methodology by applying suggestions replicating the IWLO 
which will result in China having a satisfactory legal reform.8 This leads to a great deal 
of analyzing Chinese law comparatively to Western laws, finding Chinese law 
inadequate9, and then simply urging the replication of successful western models, which 
reflect a subjective view of how the law should be10, into the Chinese legal framework.11 
5 Mark Van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards 
a New Model for Comparative Law, 495 Int’l and Comp. L. Quart’ly.514 (1998).  
6 Id. “Such a common legal culture includes shared understanding on, at least, the following points”,  
“1) A concept of what the law is and its relationship to other social norms, 2) A theory of valid legal 
sources. Who has the power to make the law and under what conditions. What is the hierarchy of the legal 
sources. How problems of collision between legal sources solved, 3) A methodology of law, both for the 
making and the adjudication of law. What rights do adjudicators have to interpret the law.,4) A theory of 
argumentation. Which kinds of arguments and of argumentative strategy are acceptable, 5) A theory of 
legitimating of the law. Why is it binding? What if it conflicts with some other, non-legal, social norms.  
6) A common basic ideology: common basic values and a common basic world view. A common view on 
the role of law in society and on the role of lawyers. A view on which problems are considered to be legal 
problems, to be solved properly by the legal system, and not just, moral or economic problems, which 
remain outside the realm of law.” 
7 Walter Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About China’s Legal 
System, 24 U. Pa. Int’l Econ. L. 624 (2003). Citing DONALD C. CLARKE, PUZZLING OBSERVVATIONS IN 
CHINESE LAW: WHEN IS A RIDDLE JUST A MISTAKE?, IN UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 93 (C.  
Stephen Hsu ed., 2003) 
8 See Michael William Dowdle, Essay Preserving Indigenous Paradigms in an Age of Globalization: 
Pragmatic Strategies for the Development of Clinical Legal Aid in China, 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. 59 (2000) 
(“International development projects need to shift their focus from one of simply replicating successful 
foreign models (what we will call a reductive strategy) to one of promoting discovery of the indigenous 
developmental implications and possibilities inherent in the domestic environment (what we will call a 
pragmatic strategy.”). 
9 See id. at 68 (noting that reductivist tend to view China’s development pessimistically while those that 
focus on more pragmatic comparison are more optimistic).   
10 See Van Hoecke, supra note 5, at 528 (“When describing the law, the doctrinal legal writer is constantly, 
either implicitly or explicitly, formulating hypotheses as regards the meaning of legal concepts, legal rules, 
legal principles or legal institutions. These hypotheses are checked on the basis of material which generally 
are considered to be authoritative and by using the classical interpretation methods. Accepting an 
interpretation, eventually, is not based on some “objective” certainly but on an inter-subjective consensus 
with the legal community”.).   
11 See generally, Guanghau Yu, Using Western Law to Improve China’s State-Owned Enterprises: of 
Takeovers and Securities Fraud, 39 Val. U.L. Rev. 339 (2004); Yuwa Wei, The Development of the 
8In general this paradigm is mostly adequate. Western securities laws are after all 
viewed as relatively successful.12 In addition its familiarity to Western scholars and long 
period of development and practice provides a powerful tool for scholars to approach the 
developing Chinese economic legal regime. Chinese lawmakers have even been openly 
solicitous of these Western legal reforms.13 In fact, Chinese laws have incorporated many 
Western made legal ideas into their developing legal regime.14 
However it is becoming increasingly clear that simply replicating Western legal 
ideas into the Chinese legal framework is unworkable.15 Examples abound where 
applying Western legal ideas to Chinese law simply does work due to the fundamental 
differences between Chinese and Western economic philosophies.16 Continuing to 
 
Securities Market and Regulation in China, 27 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 479 (2005); and Nicholas 
Howson, Speech: Regulation of Companies with Publicly Listed Share Capital in the People’s Republic of 
China, 38 Cornell Int’l L.J. 237 (2005). 
12 This is demonstrated by the success of Western capital markets, particularly in the US and London which 
follow a Western style regulatory framework, suggesting a correlation between their regulatory methods 
and overall stock market performance. There are of course a few noteworthy exceptions, such as the major 
financial scandals beginning with Enron, which suggest that even the Western system is not perfect.   
13 See Hutchens, supra note 7, at 672 (noting that “When Chinese legal enactments fall short of what 
outside observers would like, it is rarely because China to observe the outside world. It is more likely that 
perceived deficiencies in Chinese law arise from political and prudential constraints.”).  
14 See Yuma Wei, Volatility of China’s Securities Markets and Corporate Governance, 29 Suffolk 
Transnat’l L Rev. 227 (2006) (noting that for example the CSRC is modeled after the US having a strong 
national regulatory body to govern securities markets. Professor Wei goes on to note that even if China 
adopts more US like legislation there is still a problem with enforcement of that legislation that makes it 
less sure to work).  
15 See Randall Peerenboom, Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy in China: Problem or 
Paradigm?, 19 Colum. J. Asian L. 197 (2005) (“While there are technical aspects to legal reform, the 
reform process is inherently political, with many discrete decisions to be made, often among second-best 
alternatives. Few if any reforms are Pareto improvements. Rather, there are winners and losers, both among 
individual citizens and state organs of power. Yet rather than allowing domestic political systems to weight 
the costs and benefits, international actors are attempting to influence, if not outright dictate outcomes. Not 
surprisingly, in Asia and elsewhere, countries at low levels of wealth that have taken on the broader agenda 
and attempted to democratize and implement a full range of social and economic as well as civil and 
political rights have often experienced disappointing results.”). 
This is of course not to say that Western legal ideas are anyway inferior to China’s. However it is becoming 
clear that the unique characteristics of the Chinese culture may make application of Western legal ideas 
unsuitable. See generally Dowdle, supra note 8, at 66. 
16 See Van Hoecke, supra note 5, at 506 (“The Asian collectivist approach, seen most prominently in China 
but also in Japan, was determined principally under the influence of the Confucian theory of the natural 
order of reality. According to this traditional oriental thought every person has a duty to respect the natural 
order of things at the risk of disturbing this order. Individual rights are considered to be contrary to that 
9advocate for inapplicable legal norms to be applied to the Chinese economic law is not 
beneficial.17 
The reasons these ideal Western reforms will not work in China are too numerous 
and complex to address in the scope of this article.18 However, what is becoming clear is 
the awareness of an anomaly between the paradigm that scholars use to view Chinese 
reforms and reality. Better understanding is achieved through an exploration of this 
anomaly until finally the paradigm has somehow been adjusted so that the anomalous has 
become the expected.19 
In the context of Chinese securities regulation this means examining the paradigm 
that Western securities regulation rules are better than the current Chinese laws and 
should be adopted, exploring why this paradigm in many cases simply cannot work in 
China, and then adjusting the paradigm until we can predict which reforms are really 
workable in China and which aren’t.  
 
natural order. The individual has no rights but only duties toward others and towards society. When using 
his individual rights, the individual, wrongly, opposes society. By claiming his rights he is damaging 
society with his combative attitude. Therefore, conflicts are preferable not brought before the court but 
solved through reconciliation.”). See also Jiangyu Wang, Dancing With Wolves: Regulation and 
Deregulation of Foreign Investment in China’s Stock Market, 5 Asian-Pacific L. & Pol’y J. 37 (2004) 
(noting former CSRC chairman’s attempts to model the CSRC after the SEC were futile due to the 
uniqueness of the Chinese market); Dowdle, supra note 8, at 62 (noting how China civil law system does 
not recognize case law precedent and that this limits the social impact of litigation thus making the 
American paradigm much less effective); Benedict Sheehy, Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of 
Law in China and the West & Implications for Commercial Disputes, 26 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 2258 
(2006) (“Each scholar comes to a problem with her or his own mindset, point of view, assumptions, and 
understanding of the law. Not only is this plethora of views evident within legal traditions, but it greatly 
and perhaps excessively influences and thwarts comparative work”); Sheehy, supra note 16, at 238 (noting 
how the even the basic principle of law may have significantly different meaning in China than it does in 
the West.); and at 252 (noting that the concept of reducing the power of the CCP in order to fit better with 
the rule of law under the WTO is not accepted in China)  
17 See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 231 (“When laws are radically at odds with the deeply held views of 
the dominant majority, they are rarely implemented. This creates a gap between law on the books and 
actual practice that undermines respect for the legal system and rule of law, and fuels a resentful 
nationalism in Asia and other developing countries over the neo-imperialistic imposition of contested 
values.”).   
18 See Dowdle, supra note 8, at 66 (stating that knowledge of local conditions and cultures is crucial to 
effective legal development, and “identifying which of these structures and dynamic are relevant to, and 
can be employed in, service of legal development.”).   
19 See KUHN, supra note 4, at 53.  
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The development of a better paradigm will result in benefits that are highly 
critical at this moment in the international economy.20 A better paradigm will allow those 
concerned to better understand what China’s legal reforms mean and how they are 
intended by the Chinese to operate. In effect, there needs to be a paradigm shift between 
looking at how Western legal scholars think legal reforms should operate in Chinese 
capital markets to looking at how the Chinese government thinks they should operate.  
 
Part IB: The Motivation for Legal Reforms 
In order to accomplish the goal of developing a better paradigm a good place to 
start is to examine the motivation behind the enactment of various laws and reforms in 
China. Two fundamental motivators are useful to keep in mind when examining Chinese 
law; money and power.  
i. The Need for Money 
To understand the effect certain laws are intended to have on the capital markets a 
good starting point is to follow the money. Following the money is useful due to the close 
relationship between money and governmental power.21 Access to money is essential to 
the CCP in order to create and sustain power.22 Money is also a temptress for corruption 
 
20 See Dowdle, supra note 8, at 63 (“inefficient developmental paradigms do become harmful when they 
begin to prevent the development of more efficient paradigms.”).  
21 See, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 30: CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWERS OF 
TAXATION, 1787 (“Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that 
which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, 
therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community will 
permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this 
particular, one of two evils must ensue; either the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a 
substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal 
atrophy, and, in a short course of time, perish.”).   
22. See Minxin Pei, The Dark Side of China’s Rise, Foreign Policy ( March/April 2006), available at: 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18110 (“The strong belief in 
gradual but inexorable economic liberalization often has a political corollary: that market forces will 
eventually produce civil liberties and political pluralism. It’s a comforting thought. Yet these optimistic 
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of politicians.23 Evaluating China’s capital market reforms in the context that they may be 
using these reforms in order to benefit the government financially should be considerable 
a plausible and important concept.  
ii. Maintaining Power through Markets 
The Chinese government’s power to control the regulation of markets is one the 
most powerful tools it has to promote social stability, because it can arrange the markets 
in its favor to finance its own supremacy over the people.24 Examining how the Chinese 
government exercises this self perpetuating power is essential to understanding how they 
intend market regulations to work.25 
visions tend to ignore the neo-Leninist regime’s desperate need for unfettered access to economic spoils. 
Few authoritarian regimes can maintain power through coercion alone. Most mix coercion with patronage 
to secure support from key constituencies, such as the bureaucracy, the military, and business interests.”). 
23 See Pai, supra note 22 (“The most corrupt sectors in China, such as power generation, tobacco, banking, 
financial services, and infrastructure, are all state-controlled monopolies.” “Various indicators, pieced 
together from official sources, suggest endemic graft within the state. The number of “large-sum cases” 
(those involving monetary amounts greater than $6,000) nearly doubled between 1992 and 2002, indicating 
that more wealth is being looted by corrupt officials. The rot appears to be spreading up the ranks, as more 
and more senior officials have been ensnared. The number of officials at the county level and above 
prosecuted by the government rose from 1,386 in 1992 to 2,925 in 2002.”) continuing  (“An optimist might 
believe that these figures reveal stronger enforcement rather than metastasizing corruption, but the evidence 
suggests otherwise. Dishonest officials today face little risk of serious punishment. On average, 140,000 
party officials and members were caught in corruption scandals each year in the 1990s, and 5.6 percent of 
these were criminally prosecuted. In 2004, 170,850 party officials and members were implicated, but only 
4,915 (or 2.9 percent) were subject to criminal prosecution. The culture of official impunity is thriving in 
China.”)  
24 See Sheehy, supra note 16, at 232 (“In societies based on economic power and rights, as opposed to those 
societies developed on politico-social relations, those with economic power reinforce those economic 
institutions which expand their control and favor development that advances their power and rights”) 
continuing (noting that in stable democratic governments that are under no threat of rebellion the 
government has given over considerable control to economic actors such as corporations which tend to 
have a stabilizing effect).  
25 See Pai, supra note 22 (“Today, Beijing oversees a vast patronage system that secures the loyalty of 
supporters and allocates privileges to favored groups. The party appoints 81 percent of the chief executives 
of state-owned enterprises and 56 percent of all senior corporate executives. The corporate reforms 
implemented since the late 1990s—designed to turn wholly state-owned firms into shareholding 
companies—haven’t made a dent in patronage. In large- and medium-sized state enterprises (ostensibly 
converted into shareholding companies, some of which are even traded on overseas stock markets), the 
Communist Party secretaries and the chairmen of the board were the same person about half the time. In 70 
percent of the 6,275 large- and medium-sized state enterprises classified as “corporatized” as of 2001, the 
members of the party committee were members of the board of directors. All told, 5.3 million party 
officials—about 8 percent of its total membership and 16 percent of its urban members—held executive 
positions in state enterprises in 2003, the last year for which figures were available.”).  
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In China a single body has almost complete power, the Chinese Communist 
Party.26 With over 70 million members and growing with members monopolizing all 
important government positions and acting according to Party policy, the CCP’s power 
over the government and market in China is unchallenged.27 In fact it could be argued 
that the Chinese Communist Party is the most powerful body in the world based on the 
sheer amount of control it exercises over its countrymen and the sheer size of its 
country.28 
However the CCP’s power is not absolute power and it is certainly not an 
inherently permanent power. With the huge amount of control it exercises over its 
citizens lives comes a huge amount of obligations and responsibilities.29 The populace 
must be placated otherwise there is civil unrest and a potential for the lose of power 
through rebellion. This situation is intimately familiar to the CCP, which has witnesses 
 
26 See Melinda Liu and Jonathan Ansfield, Life of the Party, Newsweek International, May 23, 2005, 
available at:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7937214/site/newsweek (“The past two decades of sizzling 
economic growth should not obscure the fact that the Communist Party remains an opaque, hidebound, 
Leninist-style hierarchy. Party always trumps government. A provincial party secretary always has more 
clout than the governor. At the national level, the nine-person CCP Politburo Standing Committee always 
runs the show.”); Sheehy, supra note 16, at 225 (noting how the CCP is the basis of of all Law in China) 
and at page 234 (noting that while Western governments advocate a separation of powers, the CCP views 
itself, the government, and the will of the people as a single entity and has resisted separation of these 
powers).  
27 See China Daily a semi-official government website, available at http://www.chinatoday.com/org/cpc/  
28 The CCP considers itself masters of the people with the ability to mobilize them at its will. See Jiang 
Zemin, 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2002, available at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49007.htm#6 (“The CPC is the core of leadership for the cause of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. Governance by the Communist Party means that it leads and 
supports the people in acting as the masters of the country and mobilizes and organizes them on a most 
extensive scale to manage state and social affairs and economic and cultural undertakings according to law, 
safeguarding and realizing their fundamental interests.”).With this kind of control over 1.3 billion people, 
not to mention it’s control over the enormous Chinese army, it is not a stretch to say the CCP is the most 
powerful governing body on the planet.  
29 Initially the CCP promised the people “cradle-to-the-grave” support in all matters of social life, primarily 
through their guaranteed employers. With the decline of this system the CCP itself is struggling to fill the 
social needs gap for the people.  
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massive civil unrest that continues to grow.30 In fact, many of China’s notorious human 
rights abuses, such as limited free speech, are directly related to its desire to control and 
prevent civil unrest.31 
In order to satisfy its citizens and thus retain its power the CCP is necessarily 
becoming increasingly concerned with wealth.32 Accordingly, the CCP is beginning to 
 
30 The number of social protest in China is steadily on the rise. See the following graph in  Murray Scot 
Taner, Testimony, China’s State Control Mechanism and Methods, U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission. April 14, 2005. available at 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_04_14wrts/tanner_murray_wrts.htm 
See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 217 (Seems to apply a “Learned Hand formula” to Chinese reform, in 
that considering one-fifth of the worlds population lives in China, almost half in poverty, the consequences 
of instability in China, the region, and the world which would be very severe, there may be a argument 
made that tolerating China’s various abuses of rights and the rule of law should be tolerated so as to avoid 
this outcome);  Pai, supra note 22 (“Since the Tiananmen Square tragedy, the party has invested billions in 
beefing up the paramilitary police force (the People’s Armed Police) that has been deployed in suppressing 
internal unrest. To counter the threat posed by the information revolution, and especially the Internet, the 
Chinese government has blended technological savvy with regulatory might. The Chinese “Internet police,” 
officially known as the Ministry of Public Security’s Internet and Security Supervision Bureau, is 
reportedly more than 30,000 strong. Its Beijing branch proudly claimed that, in 2002, it participated in a 
multi-agency exercise to see whether the government could rid the Internet of “harmful content” within 48 
hours of the onset of an emergency. (During the exercise, all “harmful content” was removed in 19 hours.) 
The party’s refined strategy of “selective repression” targets only those who openly challenge its authority 
while leaving the general public alone. China is one of the few authoritarian states where homosexuality 
and cross-dressing are permitted, but political dissent is not.”).  
31 See Peerenboom, supra note 15 at 214 (noting that critics point out that the East Asian countries that have 
succeed in maintaining stability and social order, achieving economic growth...have adopted a restrictive 
approach to civil and political rights). But see Id. at 212-213 (noting an increasingly important role of the 
press in china through media outlets such as the internet which has become to break free from government 
control and influence the government through mass petitions and other methods).  
32 See Pai, supra note 22 (“A generation ago, the offspring of the ruling elite took up positions in the 
government or military; today, they go into business.” Traditionally this has not been a very fruitful 
relationship. See Id. (“Party membership and business acumen do not often go together. Because of the 
party’s fixation with high growth, government officials are rewarded for delivering, or appearing to deliver, 
14
Party members for private sector positions which it helps to place them into.33 All and all, 
it appears the CCP has no intention of relinquishing its control over the economy but 
rather it’s seeking new methods of manifesting that control.34 
In order to determine who the CCP manifests these goals it is necessary to 
examine the structure of the markets in which they operate. Specifically, the next section 
examines how the market is structured and the CCP’s participation in it through SOE’s, 
regulations, and regulatory bodies.  
 
Part II: Development, Reform, and Actions of China’s Market Economy 
This section examines the development and operation of capital markets in China. 
In order to place that development in context, it is necessary to examine the 
characterization of the Chinese market. The question of whether the Chinese market is 
really a ‘market’ in the Western sense is important because it will shed light on the 
degree of “opening up” that the CCP has really initiated and thus the degree that capital 
markets are intended to be free from government interference.  
 
Part IIA: China’s Market Hybrid 
 
precisely that. This incentive structure fuels a massive misallocation of capital to “image projects” (such as 
new factories, luxury shopping malls, recreational facilities, and unnecessary infrastructure) that burnish 
local officials’ records and strengthen their chances of promotion. The results of these mistakes—gleaming 
office complexes, industrial parks, landscaped highways, and public squares—tend to impress Western 
visitors, who view them as further proof of China’s economic prowess.”).  
33 See Liu, supra note 26 (“Now the party seems determined not simply to control China Inc., but to 
become it. That means the party—which used to execute landlords and persecute former capitalists—is now 
training private-sector business executives who are contributing significantly to China's economic boom.”). 
34 See Barry Naughton, Market Economy, Hierarchy, and Single Party Rule: How Does the Transition Pat 
in China Shape the Emerging Market Economy?, International Economic Association,  9 (2004) (Noting 
that it appears that the CCP has recently began to reassert and centralize its power over the economy in 
recent years by strengthening ties to the provinces and streamlining its administrative control).  
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An accurate characterization of the Chinese economy in recent years has proven a 
difficult task due to apparently competing interests of communist controlled state 
socialism and emerging market capitalism. In the beginning it was clear that PRC was a 
communist state with a centrally planned socialist economy modeled largely on Marx-
Lenin models derived from the USSR. In those early years, China remained isolated from 
the West and pursued a centrally planned socialist economy.35 This socialist economic 
model was found to be very inefficient due to the fact that it was not based on market 
factors such as increasing profit but rather on increasing social stability often at the cost 
of making profits.36 
In 1979 Chinese president Xidong introduced new market based reforms in order 
to improve and modernize the Chinese economy.37 When China began to modernize its 
economy and open up to the world, it became less clear what the nature of China’s 
economy was.38 It appears that China is moving along the spectrum away from a 
 
35 See Chong-En Bai, Jiangyong Lu, and Zhigang Tao, The Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform: 
Empirical Evidence from China, Stanford Center for International Development (working paper) 4 (May 
2006) (“Prior to 1979, the government planned all economic activity. Companies received funding from 
government run banks according to the plan of the Central Planning Commission. Workers were 
guaranteed lifetime employment pensions and heath care and other services in exchange for low wages.”). 
36 Id. (“In general this system was found to be very inefficient as companies and employees had little 
incentive for innovation and improvement. They stuck to the plan authored by the Central Planning 
Commission because the state essentially was a cash flow mechanism for poorly performing companies 
through the central banks.”) (“Even today there is no well-functioning independent social security network 
in China and SOE’s are increasingly being relied upon to provide that sort of social stability in China.”). 
This may also be an addition reason why the state is interested in keeping SOE’s even if they do not 
perform well.  
37 Id. at 3 (noting that at first these market reforms were mainly based on giving greater operation 
autonomy to SOE’s as well as allowing increasing numbers of private owned companies).  
38 See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 232 (“Although China is often portrayed as a country dominated by 
the rigid ideology of Leninist socialism, Chinese leaders have in fact been resolutely pragmatic, as captured 
by Deng Xiaoping’s homely advice that the color of the cat matters not as long as it captures mice”.). See 
Naughton, supra note 34, at 4-6 (noting that one of the reasons for this is the very gradual approach that 
China took in the early years of its reforms. These reforms appear to have been gradual so as to allow the 
power hierarchy to preserve its position in the economy while increasing its overall productivity.) Id., at 5 
(“This appearance is also likely based on the view that the more market orientated a country becomes the 
less powerful its state economic control becomes eventually leading according to so to democracy as the 
final phase of reform.”). See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 188, (“Moreover, capitalism, rule of law, 
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centrally planned socialist state to a market economy.39 However, the Chinese 
government’s involvement in the economy is still comparatively very high.40 
China has made many important moves that indicate it is moving towards a freer 
market economy such as reforming its legal and economic structure to attract foreign 
investors.41 Another example is Chinas’ diligent efforts to gain membership into the 
 
democracy, and human rights are sufficiently contested in theory and varied in practice, much to chagrin of 
those who would choose to impose a hilly idiosyncratic version of liberal democracy on the China, the final 
outcome in China cannot, at this point, be accurately predicted.”).  
39 But see Chong-En Bai, supra note 35, at 3 (One of the reasons China has been pushed to more economic 
reforms is that is SOE’s were constantly losing out to private run Chinese companies. In other words the  
state sector was not able to compete in its present form with private business).  
40Pei, Foreign Policy, “The Chinese state remains deeply entrenched in the economy. According to official 
data for 2003, the state directly accounted for 38 percent of the country’s GDP and employed 85 million 
people (about one third of the urban workforce). For its part, the formal private sector in urban areas 
employed only 67 million people. A research report by the financial firm UBS argues that the private sector 
in China accounts for no more than 30 percent of the economy. These figures are startling even for Asia, 
where there is a tradition of heavy state involvement in the economy. State-owned enterprises in most 
Asian countries contribute about 5 percent of GDP. In India, traditionally considered a socialist economy, 
state-owned firms generate less than 7 percent of GDP.  
But China’s tentacles are even more securely wrapped around the economy than these figures suggest. 
First, Beijing continues to own the bulk of capital. In 2003, the state controlled $1.2 trillion worth of capital 
stock, or 56 percent of the country’s fixed industrial assets. Second, the state remains, as befits a 
quintessentially Leninist regime, securely in control of the “commanding heights” of the economy: It is 
either a monopolist or a dominant player in the most important sectors, including financial services, 
banking, telecommunications, energy, steel, automobiles, natural resources, and transportation. It protects 
its monopoly profits in these sectors by blocking private domestic firms and foreign companies from 
entering the market (although in a few sectors, such as steel, telecom, and automobiles, there is competition 
among state firms). Third, the government maintains tight control over most investment projects through 
the power to issue long-term bank credit and grant land-use rights. China’s business cycle is therefore 
driven by Beijing.  
Private-sector firms have very limited access to finance or new markets. The state even dominates many 
ostensibly deregulated sectors, such as the brewing industry, the retail sector, and textiles. Of the 66 
publicly traded retailers in the country, only one is private. There are only 40 private firms among the 1,520 
Chinese companies listed on domestic and foreign exchanges.” 
41 See e.g. Bradley L. Milkwick, Feeling For Rocks While Crossing the River: The Gradual Evolution of 
Chinese Law, 14 J. Transnat’l L. and Pol. 289; Nicholas J. Faleris, Cross-Border Securitized Transactions: 
The Missing Link in Establishing a Viable Chinese Securitization Market, 26 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 201, 
201-206 (2005); See Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: 
Administrative Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 Berkely J. Int’l L. 161 
(2001). Press Release, WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference approves China’s Accession, (Nov. 10, 2001) 
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm  [“WTO News”]; 
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WTO in 2001.42 In general, China has been increasingly making international 
investments seemingly indicates its acceptance of free market economies.43 
China’s Constitution commits it to developing a socialist market economy.44 
Socialism generally means state ownership of the means of production and exchange and 
a centrally planned economy.45 A market economy is usually understood as an economy 
in which goods and services are freely traded without state ownership.46 In China this 
works out to government ownership and control over the pillars are most important assets 
of the country with mixed and private ownership allowed.47 
The degree in which the socialist government regulates, plans and controls that 
market has an enormous impact on the health of the economy and those affected by it. 
 
42WTO News, supra note 41 (“Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Pierre-Louis Girard of Switzerland, 
the Working Party concluded on 17 September almost 15 years of negotiations with China and agreed to 
forward some 900 pages of legal text for formal acceptance by the 142 Member governments of the 
WTO.”).   
43 Chinas Securities and Futures Markets, CSRC, 5 (April 2004) (“As of the end of December 2003, a total 
of 93 domestic companies had been listed overseas, raising 27.1 billion US dollars in total.  Among them, 
18 companies including big companies like People's Insurance Company of China (PICC), Sinotrans, 
Chinalife and Avichina were newly listed in overseas stock markets in 2003. The 18 companies raised 6.5 
billion US dollars in total in the overseas money market via public initial offering and refinancing in the 
secondary market.”).   
44 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, (2002) Preamble. 
45 Merriam-Webster Online dictionary, available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/socialism 
46 This does not mean that state ownership in publicly listed companies does not occur in the West. See 
Sheldon Gao, China Stock Market in Global Perspective, DOW JONES INDEXES (Sept. 2002) (noting 
that even the US and Japan governments have ownership shares in publicly listed companies. There amount 
of ownership is however usually restricted to industries like telecommunications and public utilizes and the 
size of the ownership shares has been shrinking.)  
47 See Ken Imai, Explaining the Persistence of State-ownership in China, Institute of Developing 
Economies (discussion paper) 4 (June 2006) (“what exactly the key assets are has not been defined by the 
government” However it is generally thought that high initial capital industries such as oil, heavy industry, 
infrastructure, etc. will remain SOE.”).   
This type of market has been called neo-Leninist. See Pei, supra note 22 (“Unlike Maoism, neo-Leninism 
blends one-party rule and state control of key sectors of the economy with partial market reforms and an 
end to self-imposed isolation from the world economy. The Maoist state preached egalitarianism and relied 
on the loyalty of workers and peasants. The neo-Leninist state practices elitism, draws its support from 
technocrats, the military, and the police, and co-opts new social elites (professionals and private 
entrepreneurs) and foreign capital—all vilified under Maoism. Neo-Leninism has rendered the ruling 
Chinese Communist Party more resilient but has also generated self-destructive forces.”). 
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Nowhere is this interplay more evident than in China’s capital markets.48 Capital markets 
play a crucial role in a countries economic development.49 In addition considering the 
size and global impact of China’s capital markets, the importance of determining the 
nature of China’s economy is becoming critical.50 
Part IIB: Development of China’s Capital Market   
 Chinese capital markets reappeared in China in the 1980’s.51 They began 
sporadically at the local and provincial level until their lack of uniformity prompted the 
 
48 Chinas Securities and Futures, CSRC, 6 (“It (Chinas capital market) has now become a key component 
of China’s socialist market economy and played a vital role in the reform and development of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and financial markets, in mobilizing resources, in facilitating structural adjustment and 
economic growth.”).   
49 See Wang, supra note 16, at 2 (noting the work of economist John Hicks who advocates that financial 
markets are crucial to economic development) and (“financial institutions help facilitate private and official 
capital flows, channel investment and resources to their most efficient and productive uses, encourage 
technological innovations, and in so doing, perform the function of shifting risk to those who are willing to 
bear it, as well as reducing the information costs of making transactions in market economies.”).  
50 See Solomon Tadesse, Testimony, Hearing on China and Capital Markets, U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission (2005) available at 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/hr05_08_11.htm (arguing that China is using its unique its 
unique financial relationship with its state owned enterprises to place it in an unfair advantage to buy 
strategic assets around the world.) This concern also arises due to evidence that China may be using its 
capital markets to raise money for activities at odds with its purported goals of becoming a responsible 
member of the world economy. See Frank J. Gaffney Jr., Testimony: Chinese Penetration of the Global 
Capital Markets: Are American Investors Unwittingly Buying the Rope to be Used for Their Hanging?, 
Hearing on China and Capital Markets, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2005) 
available at: http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/hr05_08_11.htm (noting companies such as 
Sinopec and COSCO are through their corporate relationships and subsidiaries engaging in illegal activities 
and relations with terrorist states. For example China National Petroleum Companys heavy interest in 
Sudans oil lead to reports of thousands of Chinese helping the genocide government in its atrocities in order 
to clear the way for oil production. Also Sinopecs $70 billion dollar investment in Iran. Sinopec’s 
subsidiaries have also been sanctioned for selling chemical weapons and technology to Iran. Or Norinco 
which is notorious weapons proliferators and is listed on Shezen stock exchange. These companies are all 
publicly listed and manage to put on a respectable face to attract massive foreign investments. For example, 
Sinopecs 3.4 billion dollar foreign investment receipt in 2000. This has lead one professor to remark, “I am 
concerned that the PRC’s efforts to bring its dubious state-owned enterprises to the world’s capital markets 
is not evidence of a Communist Chinese commitment to free trade. Rather, it is a reflection of Beijing’s 
refinement of the quote attributed to Lenin: They want the capitalists to buy the rope with which China 
ultimately will hang them.”).   
 
51 See, e.g., Wang, supra note 16, at 5-6 (noting that the first stock market in China was actually created in 
1869, but that the Communist party eliminated securities markets in 1959 as part of its efforts to eliminate 
all forms of private property. Therefore there were no securities markets in China for nearly thirty years).  
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central government to consider a standard securities exchange system through China.52 In 
the early 1990’s two national stock markets emerged at Shanghai and Shenzhen which 
each have regulatory functions over their own markets.53 China’s stock market was 
initially launched as an effort to finance its ailing SOE’s and to improve their 
performance through public listing.54 
Major bodies of law in the 1990’s were passed such as the Company Law and 
Securities Law governing listed companies and securities trading. The Company Law 
generally governs the establishment and operation of stock companies as well as 
regulating their behavior on securities markets.55 The Company law is generally credited 
as the legal basis for corporatization in China.56 The Securities Law generally governs the 
establishment and operation of stock exchanges and brokerages as well as the general 
issuing and trading of shares.57 
i. The CSRC 
In the early 1990’s the national securities regulation authority was consolidated 
into the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).58 The CSRC’s duties and 
powers can be found in the Securities Law.59 The Securities Law grants the CSRC broad 
 
52 See, e.g., Wei, supra note 11, at 488-490. 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., Wang, supra note 16, at 3.   
55 The Company Law was enacted in 1994 and has since not been significantly amended. There has a good 
deal of debate concerning the Company law since then with most wanting to amend the Company Law to 
include provisions addressing such things as fiduciary duties, classification of shares, etc.  
56 See Wei, supra note 11, at 492. 
57 See Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, Adopted at the 6th Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on December 29, 1989 (hereinafter Securities Law) 
58 China’s Securities and Futures Markets, CSRC, 4 (2004) (“Prior to the CSRC establishing sole 
authority, The People’s Bank, the Ministry of Finance, local governments, and even the stock exchanges 
each had regulatory authority over securities markets. As a result the CSRC initially struggled to 
consolidate it’s control.”). See Wei, supra note 11, at 489. 
59 Securities Law, Arts. 166-174 
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powers over the securities market including, formulating rules and regulations concerning 
the securities markets and the code of conduct of those engaged in the market, inspect 
disclosure, and investigate and deal with violations of securities laws and regulations.60 
Despite these broad powers the CSRC has no accountability to individual shareholders.61 
The CSRC has become an important source of regulations concerning listed 
companies that would expected to be found in the Company Law and Securities Law.62 
For example the CSRC has established rules concerning independent directors and 
corporate governance.63 The number of rules and regulations issued by the CSRC is 
prolific. In 2001 alone the CSRC introduced 51 new regulations.64 
This lawmaking function of the CSRC is referred to as the ‘development’ of the 
market function in contrast to the ‘regulatory’ function of the CSRC.65 While the CSRC 
is expected to perform both functions in reality the CSRC tends to emphasis one or the 
other depending on who is in charge.66 In 2001 the liberal-Western minded CSRC 
Chairman Zhou Xiaochuan who expounded and enforced the regulatory approach was 
replaced by a former army veteran who expounds the development approach, because 
their were complaints that Zhou’s strong enforcement measures were hurting the 
economy.67 
60 Securities Law, Art. 167  
61 See Wang, supra note 16, at 345. 
62 Id., at 494. 
63 Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies, CSRC 
(2001); Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies, CSRC (2002) (hereinafter Governance 
Code).  
64 See Wang, supra note 16, at 37.  
65 See Id., at 34. 
66 See Id., at 36. 
67 See Id., at 37(“ in 2001 under Zhou the Zhou disciplined more than 81 listed companies and 10 
intermediaries. The same year the Chinese stock market suffered  a loss of RMB 638 billion and entered a 
long bear period. Many investors blamed the CSRC enforcements for these loses. When Zhou’s successor 
Shang Fulin took over he made it clear that all the problems “are part of the development and shall be 
solved through development”.).   
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In general the CSRC faces problems with its regulatory functions. It has a small 
staff and limited budget.68 Considering the large number of listed companies on China’s 
stock markets there is serious doubt that the CSRC can effectively monitor all of them.69 
Additionly since the CSRC has sole control of securities regulation it is unlikely that it 
will receive any help from other agencies.70 
Part IIC. State Assets in Chinese Capital Markets 
i. State Owned Enterprises 
Since the early nineties the Chinese government had to gradually began 
experimenting with forms of mixed ownership through ‘corporatization’ in order to 
compete with private businesses.71 This triggered a large sell-off at the local level of 
small and medium SOE’s which had been losing money and were not able to be 
supported by the local governments.72 In addition the government allowed a large number 
of small SOE to file for bankruptcy.73 In contrast large SOE’s, which employee 
thousands of workers, have generally not declined.74 
68 See Hutchens, supra note 7, at 637. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See Imai, supra note 47, at 5 (“for political reasons the Chinese government does not ever refer to this as 
privatization but instead as property rights restructuring”). The Company Law which was passed in 1993 
provided the avenue of incorporation for SOE’s.  
72 See Imai, supra note 47, at 6 (“this the primary reason why the total number of SOE’s has declined 
dramatically in the last decade. However due to the fact that these small and medium companies were 
financially losers the overall assets retaining by the state the actual amount of state ownership has not really 
decreased. In addition the majority of these sell offs were to managers and employees of the companies ad 
not to outsiders. The sell off was so large that the central government had to step in at the local level and 
slow down the sale of state assets by establishing stricter regulations and restrictions.”); See Chong-En Bai, 
supra note 35, at 4 (“The sell-offs of SOE’s were bad for the economy because in order to have a new 
owner take over large amounts of debt had to be restructured, often at the states expense.”).   
73 See Imai, supra note 47, at 6.  
74 See Id., at 7 (“large SOE generally are managed directly by central state agencies and offices who are 
better able to sustain the loses of poorly performing corporations and whose goals is more united with the 
State in providing social stability by retaining jobs.”).  
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The governments purposes in promoting SOE’s to be listed on the exchanges 
were several. First the state wanted to provide fresh capital to lessen the governments 
burden of supporting the SOE’s, many of which were unprofitable or failing.75 Secondly 
the state wanted to promote internal corporate governance through securities market 
requirements.76 
The state is still the largest controlling shareholder of the majority of large firms 
in Chinese listed companies. In general for 65.6% of Chinese listed firms a single state 
shareholder controls between 20% and 70% of the equity.77 The remaining shareholders 
in Chinese listed companies are predominately individual investors.78 
ii. SASAC 
 Another major development in the Chinese capital markets is the consolidation of 
state ownership into the SASAC. The SASAC was created from its predecessors in April 
2003 to act for the government as the majority shareholder for large SOE’s. It is the 
 
75 See generally Chong-En Bai, supra note 47 (develops the thesis that SOE have been crucial to China’s 
developing economy because they are such a large employer and usually the only way the employees have 
a social security system. As such SOE have sacrificed market efficiency for social stability. They argue this 
is evidenced by the fact SOEs maintained by the central government are less likely to privatize than local 
economy’s which are less concerned with social stability). 
76 Corporate governance which was not included in the Company Law which governed corporations was 
seen by the state as an important way to increase efficiency as well as to attract investors. Since the 
Company Law was silent the CSRC stepped in and issued Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed 
Companies.  
77 See Howson, supra note 11, at 242 (analyzing data provided by CSRC in 2004).  
78 There are no more than 72 million securities trading accountants in China. See China Securities 
Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd., available at www.chinaclear.com.cn; But see Joing Deng, Building an 
Investor Friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System in China, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 347, 348 fn. 5  
(“However there are doubts about the true number of individual investors in Chinas markets because 
investors have to open separate accounts on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen market as well as the problem 
of institutional and individual investors opening several accounts apiece.”).  
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SASAC which creates the regulations controlling the sale of previous NTS’s in the split 
share reform and also has final approval on the sale of those shares.79 
Initially the SASAC was not authorized to have budgetary control or receive the 
profits of the SOE’s which it managed, a position left to the Ministry of Finance. 
However, recently the SASAC has been become ever more involved in budgetary and 
profit handling functions.80 For example the SASAC created the management Budget 
Bureau and an Audit Bureau in early 2005.81 Additionally local branches of the SASAC 
have already been given operation control over budgets and/or profit remission in several 
cities.82 
The goal of the SASAC in the split share reform seems to be in line with the 
governments socialist agenda of retaining control over key large sectors of the economy, 
while letting smaller SOE’s go.83 The SASAC currently has control over 179 of the 
largest SOE’s in China.84 Even though these SOE’s have participated in the split share 
reform program the director of SASAC has made it clear that he has no plans to sell off 
shares in certain companies.85 Instead the plan seems to be to consolidate the best of them 
into larger companies which will dominate their sectors and influence the economy.86 
79 Press Release, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Untied States, State Share Reform Not 
Selling Out All Shares, June 27, 2006, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t201442.htm 
80 See Chris Buckly, In China, Power to the Center: State Firms Agency Still Calls the Shots, International 
Herald Tribune, June 1, 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/31/news/sasac.php 
(describing how SASAC has shifted and placed senior management in several of the largest companies and 
wrestled budget control from others. Also noting that it is at the center of many major economic decisions 
which has prompted several multinationals to begin dealing directly with SASAC).  
81 Barry Naughton, SASAC Rising, China Leadership Monitor, No. 14 (2005) (citing the Chinese language 
article, Wang Shengke, SASAC Redefines Itself, 21 shiji jingji baodao, January 5, 2005. available at, 
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/jj/20050106/zh/200501050004.asp.). 
82 Id.  
83 Id. 
84 Number keeps changing and is expected to decrease 
85 See Buckly, supra note 80.  
86 Id. (“This influence has some economists wondering about the strength of Beijing’s commitment to a 
full-blown market economy.”); (“In September last year, the agency's chairman, Li Rongrong, told a 
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The role of the SASAC as both a shareholder for the governments assets and an 
important player in shaping regulatory policy has begun garnering criticism for the 
apparent conflict.87 However, the fact that the SASAC has taken control over large SOE’s 
in sectors such as petrochemicals and infrastructure has allowed the agency to show large 
profits returned since its inceptions.88 This high profit ratio, since its inception, has 
allowed it to withstand the criticism as well as to grab more power from other agencies.  
 One of the most interesting issues concerning SASAC is its legal position within 
the Chinese government. On paper the SASAC is not a public institution such as CSRC 
but is rather a “special non-governmental agency reporting directly to its State Council 
representatives”.89 In reality however the SASAC is a public institution, mainly because 
its passage of regulations and rules governing SOE’s. It’s quasi-public nature is unique 
because there is little to no regulation and accountability governing the SASAC 
directly.90 
IID. Recent Securities Market Reforms 
 The Chinese Securities markets themselves have undergone a number of 
significant reforms in recent years. Before these reforms two of the most distinguishing 
 
conference in Beijing that China must nurture its own multinationals to challenge the dominance of foreign 
corporations.” "To accelerate the strategic adjustment of China's economic structure," he said, "we must 
vigorously pursue a strategy of creating major corporate conglomerates." Li also said state-owned 
companies that were not among the three biggest in their industries would be "restructured," a euphemistic 
term for privatization.”).   
87 See Buckly, supra note 80; Naughton, supra note 81.  
88 See Buckly, supra note 80. 
89 See Naughton, supra note 81.  
90 Id., (“The SASAC’s legal position is unclear because China has never been able to draft a law governing 
control of state assets. A drafting group was established in 1993, but after working through a score of 
drafts, it found its final version junked. The group had attempted to write a broad constitutional charter for 
the treatment of state assets, but apparently had stumbled into far too many specific problems and conflicts 
of interest.”).   
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features of the Chinese capital markets were the classification of stocks based on who the 
owner was and the rule against trading more than 30% of SOE’s on the market. In recent 
years reforms have substantially altered both of these characteristics.  
i. Classification of Stocks 
 One of the most distinguishing features of the Chinese stock market is the 
classification of stocks. After the state retained its two-thirds majority of NTS, the 
remaining one-third of shares are not only classified on the universal classification as 
common stock, preferred stock, etc., but also on the character and nationality of the stock 
holder. The characterizations are state shares, legal person shares, A shares and B 
shares.91 The origins of this classification are difficult to determine because there is no 
mention of it in either the Company Law or the Securities Law.92 
State shares are shares held by the central government or its agencies such as local 
governments acting on its behalf. These shares were not allowed to be traded on the open 
market. Legal Person Shares are shares which are held by a legal person such as another 
company or organization with legal person status. Additionally the government can hold 
legal person shares through a legal person intermediary such as another SOE. It is 
common for these types of shares to be sold when the State is the majority but not sole 
owner of the company. While the exact number of these two types of shares is difficult to 
ascertain, with official estimates at just over 50 percent and many private estimates at 
much higher levels.93 
91 In addition there are classification of stock depending on which international market they are listed on. 
For example shares  issued on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are denominated H shares and stocks listed 
on NYSE are denominated N shares.  
92 See Wang, supra note 16, at 14.  
93 See Imai, supra note 47, at 9. Some sources place the number of state owned shares on the market as high 
as 80%.  
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A shares are shares that are owned by domestic individual investors and 
institutions. These are freely traded on domestic markets and in fact are the most 
commonly traded.94 Recently in order to open up its markets to foreign investment, China 
has been allowing foreigners to purchase A shares through the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor program.95 In order to qualify as a QFII the purchaser must meet 
approval from the CSRC which requires the QFII to have very large capital reserves as 
well as a long and unblemished reputation. Currently the CSRC has granted QFII status 
to approximately 20 foreign institutional investors.96 The other way that foreigners may 
purchase A shares is to become strategic investors. Strategic investors must buy a 
minimum 10% stake in the company and hold it for a minimum of three years.  
B shares are shares which were originally offered to international investors and 
not allowed to be sold to domestic investors. In 2001 the government opened the B share 
market to allow domestic investors to purchase them with foreign currency.97 These 
shares were created in order to obtain foreign currency as well as to demonstrate Chinas 
progress in opening its markets to foreign investors.98 They are denominated in Chinese 
currency but bought and sold in foreign currency. They are listed on securities exchanges 
in China.  
 
94 China Securities and Futures, CSRC, 10 (2005) (“As of the end of December 2003, the listed companies 
in Mainland China had issued a total of 580.8 billion A shares and raised a total of CNY 761.7 billion. The 
market capitalization of A share companies amounted to CNY 4,152.1 billion, of which the market 
capitalization of tradable shares was CNY 1,230.6 billion.”). 
95 Provisional Measures on Administration of Domestic Securities Investments of Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors, Joint Decree No. 12 of the CSRC and People’s Bank of China, Nov. 5 2002 
Chinas Securities and Futures, CSRC, 5 (2205) For a history of the QFII, see Wang, supra note 16, at 22.  
96 See Wang, supra note 16, at 22. 
97 CSRC, Circular of the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, Notice on Issues Concerning Individual Domestic Residents’ Investment in Foreign Currency 
Stocks Listed in the Domestic Stock Markets, CSRC Decree No. 22 2001.  
98 See Wang, supra note 16, at 21 (citing Kejian Chao, Restore the Financing Functions of and Boost the B 
Shares Market, Shanghai Securities Daily (Oct. 31 2003) This article appears in Chinese at the website and 
I must rely on authors translation.  
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B shares have the same rights to dividends as A shares. However, the market for 
these shares remains quite small and since 2001 no company and China has been 
authorized to issues B shares in the market.99 As a result A shares are several times more 
valuable in the market than B shares.100 
ii. Split Share Reform 
 Generally when a corporation is listed the majority of its stock is placed 
on the market and traded. However this would result in lose of state control and 
ownership of the states means of production and exchange. In order to retain the socialist 
doctrines of state ownership and control over the economy the government restricted the 
amount of shares which could be traded of a SOE to one-third of all shares. The 
remaining two-thirds of the corporation’s shares were non-tradable shares (NTS). NTS 
were issued to promoters, business partners and employees, but the majority were 
retaining by the state.  In total these NTS accounted for 63% of the total shares in 
Chinese capital market as late as February 2006 with the state retaining the majority.101 
This is referred to as the split share problem and is discussed below.  
In 2005, China initiated the split share reform program in response to growing 
discontent about split share program.102 Specifically because non state shareholders were 
 
99 Id.   
100 See Beltratti and Bortolotti, The Nont-radable Share Reform in the Chinese Stock Market, Noomura 
Institute (April 2006).  
101 Id. 
102 See ChinaDaily.com, Poor Governance Blamed for Securities Markets, June 20, 2006, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/03/content_430562.htmBy 2003  (“A recent survey by 
a Shanghai-based investment consultancy firm shows that at least 70 percent institutional investors and 90 
percent minority share holders believe that the split share structure should be given top priority by the 
leadership when they consider ways to revive the market. In January 2004 the Chinese government 
officially acknowledged that NTS were a problem with ongoing market reform and committed itself to 
solving the problem.  
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regulated to being minority shareholders there was increasing concerning that there was 
no way in which to institute corporate governance reforms or effectively monitor actions 
by the corporations.103 This was viewed as one of the main reasons for Chinese capital 
markets poor performance between 2001-2005 despite a rapidly growing economy.104 
The reform essentially allows all previously non-tradable state-owned shares to be 
traded on the markets and all future IPO’s to have entirely tradable shares.105 Due to 
concerns about downward pressure on the market and loss of value to existing 
shareholders from the large amount of new stock being placed in the market the reform 
calls for majority state shareholders to negotiate some form of acceptable compensation 
to minority shareholders for the loss in value of their stock.106 In effect the shareholders 
of the companies themselves draw up the reform plan which is then approved by 
regulators. In order for the plan to proceed the public shareholders must approve it by a 
two-thirds vote. While this negotiation is occurring the issuance of shares and IPO’s is 
frozen in order to prevent misconduct and sell-offs. Additionally, the majority 
shareholder is very limited in the amount of stock that they can sell in the market in the 
first two years after the reform.  
 The split share reform program was initiated through three phases. The reform 
was initiated by a two trial runs involving 4 companies in April 2005 and than 42 
 
103 See Beltratti, supra note 100, at 2 (“In addition major NTS shareholders were impervious to market 
conditions due to the fact it was impossible to sell. Also the small free float made the market more illiquid 
and prone to manipulation.”).  
104 An additional view is that the lack of corporate governance in general was what caused the decline.  
105 See Beltratti, note 100, at 3 (noting that two previous attempts to make NTS tradeable had failed prior to 
this reform. One in 1999 which was an experiment involving only 2 companies was not well received by 
investors, and one in 2001 which failed because the government priced the tradeable and non-tradable 
shares equally).  
106 See Id. (“This negotiation between the NTS majority shareholders and minority shareholders is the 
distinguishing feature between the current reforms and previous failed attempts at reducing NTS shares. It 
is in fact quite innovative because it replaces the usual top down reform program initiated by the state.”).  
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companies in June 2005 which account for 10% of the stock market.107 On August 24, 
2005 the government extended the reform program to all companies with publicly listed 
stock. To date over 60 percent of publicly listed SOE’s have participated in the reform.108 
Reforms in stock classification and non-tradeable shares have significantly altered 
the investment environment in Chinese capital markets. The QFII reform as well as 
others has increased international participation in Chinese capital markets. In addition the 
creation of the SASAC has introduced a powerful player into the market which will have 
significant influence over the Chinese economy in future years. These reforms aid in 
making China more competitive in the international market. The next section examines 
this competitive position and also some of the ways that China is using it.   
 
IIE. China’s Power in the International Market and Use Thereof.  
China has become an economic powerhouse on the international level. Adjusting 
for purchasing power differentials, China is already the world's second largest economy. 
Growing at a faster clip than any other major nation, it is on course to surpass the United 
States as the world's largest economy within two decades.109 
In many industries, especially those that are labor intensive, China is by now the 
dominant global player. China-based factories make 70 percent of the world's toys, 60 
percent of its bicycles, half its shoes, and one-third of its luggage. In those product 
 
107 Id. 
108 China Daily, Split Share Reform, (March 2006) available at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/156140.htm  (“As of Jan 20, 2006. 462 companies had participated 
in the reform, of these 284 were local SOE and 46 were central SOE’s.”).  
109 See ODED SHENKAR, CHINESE CENTURY: THE RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE OF POWER, AND YOUR JOB, (2005) (these quotes are taken out of an 
online article promoting the book itself, available at:  
http://www.whartonsp.com/articles/article.asp?p=345008&rl=1).  
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categories, it is often impossible to find a non-Chinese product on store shelves.110 This 
drive for exporting is fueled by the need for growth in China’s economy.111 
China’s importance in the global economy has by now surpassed most of the 
other members of the G-8.112 It huge effect on global supply and demand is now rivaled 
only by the US.113 As China competes with the US for superpower strength it has become 
a major creditor of the US holding hundreds of billions of dollars in US securities.114 This 
creditor status is likely to have a large strategic impact on Chinese-US relations.115 
China’s heavy economic clout in the global market has also given it the ability to 
become powerful politically.116 China’s huge trade deals with other countries have given 
 
110 Id. 
111 Id. China is still less reliant on exports than many other countries in Asia (such as Malaysia) and outside 
(such as Belgium), but its dependence is growing, and the export drive must continue for it to fund its 
growing imports of capital goods and production inputs and prevent a social and political time bomb from 
exploding, with unemployment serving as the trigger. Not only does China need to provide jobs to a huge 
cohort of young people, but it also must worry about the many millions still employed in money-losing 
state enterprises and the 100–200 million people who have left the countryside in search of work in urban 
areas and who would be the first to be affected by a serious economic downturn. Disaffected peasants have 
been a source of rebellion throughout Chinese history, and economic well-being is especially critical to a 
regime that has shed its ideological base and now relies on economic prosperity and nationalism as its sole 
sources of legitimacy. 
112 Jeffrey E. Garten, China: The Missing Member at the G-8 Table, YaleGlobal, (June 2004) available at: 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4023 (“China has become far more important to the global 
economy than most other G-8 members such as Italy, Canada and even France.”). 
113 Id. (“China has become a major player in international finance. It receives more direct foreign 
investment than any nation but the US. It possesses more foreign exchange reserves than any country 
besides Japan. Next to the US, China has more impact on global supply and demand than any other 
country. Indeed, China is becoming as central to global manufacturing as Saudi Arabia is to oil.”). 
114 Id.( “Beijing has become a critical creditor to Uncle Sam, holding hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S. 
government securities.”). 
115 Id. (“How it uses this leverage ought to be of major concern to Washington and Wall Street, and to 
anyone – such as home owners, car purchasers, or average investors – who is affected by interest rates or 
the value of the dollar.”) Keith Bradsher, Failed Unocal Bid Unlikely to Halt China’s Plans, New York 
Times (August 3, 2005) available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/02/business/chioil.php (“The 
Chinese government still has $711 billion in foreign currency reserves that need to be invested. The 
reserves are mostly parked in Treasuries, American mortgage-backed securities and a mishmash of other 
financial instruments earning a meager return that has become controversial within China.”).  
116 There are also economically related human rights concerns, See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 185 
(“critics fear…China is likely to take advantage of its growing economic and geopolitical influence to 
defend and advocate rights policies and a normative vision of the world at odds with current rights policies 
based on secular liberalism”.).  
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China enormous clout in such organizations as the UN and WTO.117 It is predicted that 
China will continue to increase strategic alliances with allies such as India and Brazil to 
create a powerful political alliance that would have the power to significantly affect all 
aspects of the global economy.118 
China is using its economic clout to major deals on the international level. In one 
area in particular, the pursuit of oil, China is brokering enormous deals throughout the 
world. Normally this would not be an expected move. However, China is pursuing these 
deals with terrorist supporting countries like Iran and Sudan. This seems to suggest that 
China is not interested in becoming a responsible member of the international economic 
community.  
 
i. China Deal with Iran 
 China has recently established strong long economic term ties to Iran.119 These 
ties are primary based on China’s growing need for vast amounts of foreign oil and a 
thriving export market in Iran for Chinese goods.120 However, China has not been 
 
117 See Garten, supra note 112 (“China’s ties to other emerging markets such as Brazil and India may also 
alter the course of global politics.”). 
118 Id. (“A political bloc of big developing countries could have enormous influence in the World Trade 
Organization, for example. There is a good chance that such a group will emerge, and under Chinese 
leadership.”).   
119 Id. (China has recently signed a $70 billion dollar oil and natural gas deal with Iran that will operate for 
the next 20 years at least.)  
120 Robin Wright, Iran’s New Alliance With China Could Cost U.S. Leverage, Washington Post (November 
17, 2004) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55414-2004Nov16.html (“An oil 
exporter until 1993, China now produces only for domestic use. Its proven oil reserves could be depleted in 
14 years, oil analysts say, so the country is aggressively trying to secure future suppliers. Iran is now 
China's second-largest source of imported oil.”).  
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content to just buy oil, increasingly China has become involved in large amounts of arms 
sales to Iran.121 
China’s economic ties to Iran have grown into a powerful strategic alliance. China 
has become a large obstacle to effectively dealing with Iran in the UN.122 In addition, 
China’s relationship with Iran is making it harder for the sanctions that Western countries 
impose on Iran to have an impact.123 China’s disregard for the reasons why Iran is 
considered a threat is likely based on its own history of not being considered a 
responsible world power.124 
ii. China Deals with Sudan 
 China’s quest for oil has also led it to develop strong ties with Sudan and aid the  
Sudanese government in the genocide of Darfur.125 Sudan is China’s largest overseas oil 
project and also Sudan’s largest supplier of arms.126 China’s has protected it’s investment 
 
121 Id. (“Accurate trade figures are difficult to get, in part because trade is increasing so rapidly and partly 
because China's large arms sales to Iran are not included or publicized. But at the second annual Iran-China 
trade fair here in May, Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng said trade had increased by 50 
percent in 2003 over the previous year, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. Beijing has also 
provided Iran with advanced military technology, including missile technology, U.S. officials say. In April 
2004, the Bush administration imposed sanctions on Chinese manufacturers of equipment that can be used 
to develop weapons of mass destruction.”).  
122 Id. (“Holding a veto at the U.N. Security Council, China has become the key obstacle to putting 
international pressure on Iran.”). 
123 Id. (“China's trade with Iran is weakening the impact on Iranian policy of various U.S. economic 
embargoes, analysts here say. "Sanctions are not effective nowadays because we have many options in 
secondary markets, like China," said Hossein Shariatmadari, a leading conservative theorist and editor of 
the Kayhan newspapers.”).  
124 Id. (“The Iran-China ties may be partly a response to the United States, analysts here say. President 
Bush's strategy has been to contain both China and the Islamic republic, said Siamak Namazi, a political 
and economic analyst, "so that's created natural allies." But today, China with its one-party political system 
appears to feel fewer restraints than do Western nations in dealing with the world's only theocracy. "For 
China, issues like human rights don't affect your relations with Iran," Namazi said.”).  
125 Peter S. Goodman, China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil Industry: Beijing Supplies Arms Used on 
Villagers, Washington Post (December 23, 2004) available at:   
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by seeking protection of its assets from the same government that is responsible for the 
genocide.127 This relationship has prolonged the genocide in Sudan because China has 
used its strong position on the UN to block effective resolution of the genocide.128 
iii. China Attempts to Deal with the US: Unocal 
 In 2005 CNOOC oil company, a SOE of the Chinese government, made a $18.5 
billion dollar bid to buy US based Unocal oil company.129 However US congress and 
presidential resistance to the deal forced the Chinese to withdrawal their offer.130 The US 
 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html  (“China National Petroleum 
Corp., still owned by the Communist Party government, bought into the Sudan consortium in 1996. It 
joined with Sudan's Energy Ministry to build the country's largest refinery, then last year invested in a $300 
million expansion that nearly doubled production, according to a report in the Shenzhen Business Post.”). 
126 Id. (“Sudan is China's largest overseas oil project. China is Sudan's largest supplier of arms, according to 
a former Sudan government minister. Chinese-made tanks, fighter planes, bombers, helicopters, machine 
guns and rocket-propelled grenades have intensified Sudan's two-decade-old north-south civil war.”).  
127 Id. (“For years, the rebels have attacked oil installations, seeking to deprive the Sudan government of the 
wherewithal to pursue a civil war that has killed more than 2 million people and displaced 4 million from 
their homes over the past two decades. But the Chinese laborers are protected: They work under the 
vigilant gaze of Sudanese government troops armed largely with Chinese-made weapons -- a partnership of 
the world's fastest-growing oil consumer with a pariah state accused of fostering genocide in its western 
Darfur region.” And “A recent report in the state-controlled China Business News quotes a Chinese foreign 
affairs official as saying that Beijing has asked Khartoum to "send troops" to areas in which Chinese 
companies operate.”). 
128 Id. (“From its seat on the United Nations Security Council, China has been Sudan's chief diplomatic 
ally. In recent months, the council has neared votes on a series of resolutions aimed at pressuring Sudan's 
predominantly Arab government to protect the African tribes under attack in Darfur and stop support for 
militias by threatening to sanction its oil sales. China has threatened to veto such actions while watering 
down the threat of oil sanctions. 
129 See Ben White, Chinese Drop Bid to Buy US Oil Firm, Washington Post (August 3, 2005) (“Cnooc 
(pronounced SEA-nook), which is the Hong Kong listed unit of its state-owned parent, China National 
Offshore Oil Corp, was stung. The state owns 70 percent of CNOOC.”). 
 
Shai Oster, China’s CNOOC learns from Unocal Uproar, Wall Street Journal. Available at: 
http://money.aol.com/news/articles/_a/chinas-cnooc-learns-from-unocal-
uproar/n20060731112009990005?cid=403 
130 Id. “Chinese oil company Cnooc Ltd. on Tuesday withdrew its $18.5 billion takeover bid for California 
energy firm Unocal Corp., saying it could not overcome resistance from politicians in Washington who said 
such a deal could threaten U.S. national security and violate the rules of fair trade.” See Bradsher, supra 
note 115 (“The sight of a Chinese company trying to buy a company once known for the 76 brand made the 
proposed deal a lightning rod for American worries about everything from manufacturing job losses to high 
oil prices to the security of energy supplies. But while U.S. congressional resistance appears to have 
torpedoed the Chinese bid, the economic fundamentals behind that bid remain in place, from China's vast 
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concerns were based on loss of jobs, high oil prices and national security.131 The Chinese 
found themselves shocked by the US resistance as the Chinese government had gone to 
great lengths to publicize the deal as a strictly commercial one.132 
CNOOC’s chairman was adamant that the deal was a strictly commercial one and 
that the Chinese government had no connection to the deal.133 Executives emphasizing 
that the government did not control the decisions of the CNOOC board and were merely 
a shareholder.134 However in order to make the financing work CNOOC borrowed nearly 
 
foreign currency reserves to its ravenous appetite for imported oil.”). See White, supra note 129 (“But the 
sources said Cnooc Chairman Fu Chengyu and other executives and directors were shocked by the intensity 
of the negative reaction from Congress and by signals that the administration did not want to decide 
whether to accept or reject Cnooc's bid. The president has final authority to accept or reject such deals.”).  
131 Bradsher, supra note 115.  
132 Id. “The most immediate effect from the failed bid may be on Chinese public opinion toward the United 
States. China's state-controlled media had devoted extensive coverage to the Cnooc bid and presented it to 
the public as an exclusively commercial arrangement”  “"This is a very symbolic deal that made Chinese 
people proud of themselves," said Jin Canrong, associate dean of the School of International Studies at 
People's University. "Definitely they will feel some kind of disappointment.”). 
133Shai Oster, China’s CNOOC learns from Unocal Uproar, Wall Street Journal. Available at: 
http://money.aol.com/news/articles/_a/chinas-cnooc-learns-from-unocal-
uproar/n20060731112009990005?cid=403 (the following are excerts interview with Mr. Fu who is the 
Chairman of CNOOC.) 
(“WSJ: How is Cnooc different from other major state-owned oil companies and enterprises? 
Mr. Fu: We get no financial support from the state. We, the company and the board, are responsible for all 
the decisions we took, for all the financial results or consequences - not the government. 
WSJ: Did you get any cheap loans from the state or other funding? 
Mr. Fu: The government did not finance even one cent. All the money we used would be from commercial 
loans, most of them from our U.S. companies, issuance of new shares and partially from our parent.”). 
134 Id. 
(“WSJ: I have to challenge you on that. Your biggest stakeholder is the state. 
Mr. Fu: Whatever the percentage, they are all shareholders. As long as I can deliver good value to 
shareholders they are happy. 
WSJ: But the government is the largest shareholder. 
Mr. Fu: When I say the government is a shareholder, it's not just because they are largest, also because they 
are not interfering with out daily operations. They are not important in decision making on how we run this 
company. Our management is the same as any other company in the market. 
WSJ: So, who does make the final investment decisions at Cnooc? 
Mr. Fu: The final approval is by our board, not by the government.”).  
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$6 billion from a large state owned bank, which had just recently received a large influx 
of government cash.135 
These three deals show that while China’s SOE’s may appear to be pursuing 
legitimate government interests there is in fact a large degree of state involvement 
involved in these SOE’s as evidenced by the Chinese governments involvement at a 
political level to support them. These deals illustrate one form of how the Chinese 
government is willing to support SOE’s in a competitive global market in order to further 
its national interest. It is easy to image that the Chinese government supports its SOE’s in 
the competitive domestic market in the same kinds of ways.  
 
Part III: Laws Affecting Investment in China’s Domestic Markets 
 This Part examines various aspects of the Chinese legal framework governing 
capital markets. In particular it focuses on various the protections offered under Chinese 
laws against various market manipulations and breaches of fiduciary duties. In addition 
this part focuses on some of the laws affecting SOE’s in the marketplace. Finally there is 
a brief discussion concerning WTO laws which could be construed to affect Chinese 
domestic capital markets. In order to place the Chinese legal framework in context this 
section outlines the structure of the Chinese government and its relations to the judiciary.  
 
Part IIIA: Structure of Government Under Constitution 
 
135 Bradsher, supra note 115 (“A Cnooc deal could have provided another investment opportunity; the 
government announced in late spring that it would inject $15 billion into a big state-owned bank, which in 
turn agreed to lend $6 billion for the Cnooc bid. Jin Canrong, associate dean of the School of International 
Studies at People's University. said that the State Administration of Foreign Exchange would continue 
managing the reserves with an eye to maximizing the return on them.”). 
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The Chinese Government is a hierarchical government established and run by the 
Chinese Communist Party.136 The Chinese Communist Party is the sole party with any 
real authority within the Chinese Government.137 While not required, nearly all members 
of government are members of the CCP.138 Therefore the CCP has complete control over 
all aspects of the central government.  
The National Peoples Congress is by name the supreme organ of power in the 
Chinese government.139 However the NPC meets only once a year for a few weeks and 
essentially approves the actions of the real organ of power in Chinese politics, the 
Standing Committee of the NPC. The Standing Committee which is composed of 
powerful member of the CCP includes the president and premier and is the permanent 
role of the NCP exercising nearly all of its powers.140 
Subordinate to the Standing Committee are the major organs of administration, 
judicial, and military power. The State Council is the highest administrative party with 
broad administrative powers exercised subserviently to the Standing Committee.141 
Below the State Council are the various Ministries such as the Minister of Finance and 
the SASAC.142 
136 China’s Constitution which was formulated by the CCP and structures the government in such a way 
that the CCP is the primary authority in government usually acting through the Standing Committee.  
137 See infra footnotes, 25-27 and accompanying text 
138 Id. 
139 Constitution Article 57 (naming the NPC the “highest organ of state power).  
140 Constitution Article 57 (naming the Standing Committee as the permanent body of the NPC). 
Constitution Article 67 (gives the Standing Committee nearly all of the power of the NPC including 
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution, enacting, amending, and interpreting laws and supervising the 
State Council, CMC and Supreme Court).  
141 Constitution Article 85, (naming State Council as “highest organ of state administration). Constitution 
Article 89 (giving State Council power to adopt administrative rules, control Ministries, and direct some 
economic affairs). Constitution Article 92 (making State Council responsible to NPC and Standing 
Committee).  
142 Constitution Article 89(3).  
37
Equally powerful to the State Council are the Supreme People’s Court and the 
Central Military Commission. The Supreme People’s Court while guaranteed 
independence in the constitution, is in fact responsible to the Standing Committee.143 The 
CMC is a very powerful force in China and is considered crucial to the Standing 
Committee in order to exercise power and maintain domestic stability.144 
Local governments are modeled similarly to the central NPC and are broken down 
into provinces, municipalities, counties, cities, etc.145 Their power is based on a hierarchy 
within the government.146 Large local governments elect members to serve as delegates 
to the NPC, thus in theory obtaining equal representation before the Central 
Government.147 Thus the enforcement of laws in China, by both the courts and regulatory 
bodies occurs within a highly hierarchical political framework, as opposed to separate 
from the political framework as occurs in most Western democracies.  
 
Part IIIB: Chinese Courts  
Chinese courts tend to be limited in their powers by largely non-legal concerns. 
Politically, the Constitution which gives the Standing Committee the power to supervise 
the courts has been interpreted by the Standing Committee to give it the authority to 
supervise final judicial decisions.148 
143 Constitution Article 126 (“in accordance with the law exercise judicial power independently and are not 
subject to interference by administrative organs, public organizations, or individuals.”) Constitution Article 
128, (“The Supreme People’s Courts is responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee.”).   
144 Constitution Article 94 (the CMC is responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee).  
145 Constitution Article 95. 
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 See Peerenboom, supra note 15 at 218.   
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Chinese courts operate under the civil law tradition and therefore generally do 
not allow for judge made law.149 Under this civil law system it is the local and central 
governments that largely provide the law which Chinese courts are forced to follow. 
Chinese courts invoke a very limited power to interpret legislation. Courts are not 
allowed to strike down even administrative regulations because they are unconstitutional 
or inconsistent with a higher level court holding.150 The only option the courts can seek is 
to apply a higher level law or administrative decision.151 
In addition governments at the same level as the courts exert budgetary and 
appointment powers over the courts.152 These appointment powers include appointing 
judges to the courts and the control over there promotion.153 Additionally government 
adjudication committees oversee the courts and can influence the decisions of courts in 
some cases.154 It is within these limited political constraints that the Chinese courts 
decide cases involving Security Law violations.  
 
Part IIIC: Insider Trading and Market Manipulation  
In general, insider trading and market manipulation are illegal under the laws of 
China.155 The primary law governing these activities is the Securities Law of the People’s 
 
149 However do to increasing publication of important or sensitive cases and judicial comments  in China 
there is a inevitable degree of precedent in interpretation. See generally Hutchens, supra note 7, at fn. 84 
and 85 (which while citing some of the numerous articles dealing with the problems of the civil law 
tradition in China, also notes that in particularly publication of cases in the Supreme People’s Court have 
begun to have a precedent value).  
150 See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 219.  
151 Id. 
152 See Hutchens, supra note 7 at 621 (“For examples, the Qingdao People’s congress controls the budget 
and personnel of the Qingdao People’s Courts.”)  
153 Id. at 643. 
154 Id. at 621.  
155 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, Adopted at the 6th Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on December 29, 1989. Article 5.  
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Republic of China.156 The Securities Law is premised on the fact that all parties involved 
in the trading of securities have equal legal statutes and must adhere to the principles of 
voluntariness, compensation and good faith.157 
Insider trading is the where persons with knowledge of material inside 
information on securities trading take advantage of such inside information to engage in 
securities trading.158 Market manipulation is generally manipulating the trading prices of 
share through unfair means such as carrying out combined or successive purchases to 
build an advantage or selling to oneself or another acting on one’s behalf.159 
Persons with knowledge of inside information include directors, supervisor, and 
managers of companies as well as members of the securities regulatory authority and 
other public intermediary organizations that participate in securities trading pursuant to 
duty.160 
The Securities Law prohibits certain members of the government from holding, 
purchasing, and selling shares.161 These government members include staff members of 
the securities regulatory authority and employees and of stock exchanges and securities 
registration and clearing institutions.162 Generally State-owned enterprises and enterprises 
where State-owned assets constitute a controlling interest may not speculate in listed 
shares.163 Due to the lack of the courts interpretive powers it is unclear whether they 
interpret the definitions of insider and inside information to government officials such as 
the SASAC from trading on political or economic information.  
 
156 Id.  
157 Securities Law, Article 4 
158 Securities Law, Article 67 
159 Securities Law, Article 71 
160 Securities Law, Article 68  
161 Securities Law, Article 37 
162 Id.  
163 Securities Law, Article 76  
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Part IIID: Fiduciary Duties 
Chinese law lacks a comprehensive definition of the fiduciary duties (duty of care 
and duty of loyalty) for directors, officers, board members, and controlling shareholders 
in either the Security Law or the Company Law. The Company law does have some 
articulation of these duties, however they are frequently described as weak and 
fragmentary.164 
The description of fiduciary duty is found in Article 59 the Company Law which 
states that “directors, supervisor, or the general manager shall abide by the articles of 
association, faithfully perform their duties, and safeguard the interests of the company, 
and may not abuse their positions and authorities at the company for private gain.”165 
There is also a duty of loyalty found in Article 61 of the Company Law which 
states that “A director or the general manager may not engage in the same business as the 
company in which he serves as a director or the general manager either for his own 
account or for any other person's account, or engage in any activity detrimental to 
company interests.”166 This is followed in Article 62 by a duty not to disclose 
confidential information unless required by law or consented to by the shareholders 
committee.167 
164 See Company Law arts. 57-63.   
165 Company Law Art. 59.  
166 Company Law Art. 61. 
167 Company Law Art. 62.  
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The Company Law also makes the director, supervisor or general manager 
personally liable for causing detriment to the company in violation of any national 
statute, administrative regulation, or the articles of association.168 
i. The Code of Corporate Governance  
In 2002, the CSRC issued the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies in China. The Code is applicable to all listed companies in China.169 
Companies must incorporate the requirements of the Code in their Articles of 
Association, or when they amend them.170 Listed companies are required to act in the 
spirit of the Code and if the CSRC determines that a company’s corporate governance 
structure has major problems it may instruct the Company to make corrections.171 
One of the most important aspects of the Governance Code is rules governing the 
behavior of controlling shareholders. The Governance Code specifically states that the 
controlling shareholders have a “duty of good faith” towards the listed company and to 
the other shareholders. 172 The controlling shareholder is required to strictly observe laws 
and not allowed to harm the interest of the company through asset restructuring or 
seeking personal gain.173 In addition, the controlling shareholder, prior to listing the 
 
168 Company Law Art. 64.  
169 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, CSRC, preface. Available at 
www.csrc.gov.cn.  
170 Id. (“Requirements of the Code shall be embodied when listed companies formulate or amend their 
articles of association or rules of governance.”) It is not clear if companies which have already filed their 
Articles of Association prior to the 2002 issuance of the Code are required to embody the principles of the 
Code. If not than this leaves a vast number of companies in China that are not bound by the Code.  
171 Id. This language seems to clearly indicate that breaches of the Code that are not otherwise violations of 
the Securities Laws and Company Law will not be subject to real enforcement such as penalties, 
imprisonment, or civil liability.  
172 Governance Code, section 19. 
173 Id. 
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company, must sever its social functions from the company such as stripping out non-
operational assets and welfare institutions.174 
The Governance Code also describes several duty of loyalty type provisions for 
controlling shareholders. A controlling shareholder who owns other business or 
institutions that provide services to the listed company must act in accordance with 
commercial principles.175 More specifically:  
“A listed company's business shall be completely independent from that of its controlling 
shareholders. Controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries shall not engage in the same 
or similar business as that of the listed company. Controlling shareholders shall adopt 
efficient measures to avoid competition with the listed company.”176 
The Governance Code also contains several provisions on the independence of 
controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholder shall not directly or indirectly 
interfere with the company’s decisions or business activities.177 More specifically: 
 “A listed company shall be separated from its controlling shareholders in such aspects as 
personnel, assets and financial affairs, shall be independent in institution and business, 
shall practice independent business accounting, and shall independently bear risks and 
obligations.”178 
The Governance Code also addresses related party transactions. These are not 
defined in the Governance Code except calling them connected parties, but it is likely to 
include companies which have an overlap of owners.179 When related party transactions 
occur they must be in writing and describe the transactions in specific and concrete 
terms.180 The related party transactions must observe the principles of equality, 
 
174 Governance Code, section 16. 
175 Governance Code, section 17.  
176 Governance Code, section 27. 
177 Governance Code. section 21. 
178 Governance Code, section 22. 
179 Governance Code, section 12. 
180 Id. 
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voluntarily, and making compensation for equal value.181 Measures must be taken by the 
listed company in prevent the connected party from harming the listed company by 
monopolizing purchase or sales channels.182 The prices in the transaction must conform 
to independent third party prices.183 
Part IIIE: Private Securities Litigation 
Until recently Chinese Courts refused to accept private securities litigation claims. 
This was despite the fact that there was some legal basis for the filing of such claims.184 
In fact courts were faced with several securities litigation cases but simply refused to hear 
them.185 
In September of 2001 the SPC issued a notice which placed a temporary ban on 
all private securities litigation suits.186 In early 2003 the SCP released the ban in a limited 
way when it issued Several Regulations Concerning the Adjudication of Civil 
Compensation Based upon Misrepresentation.(PSL Rules).187 
The PSL rules create a systematic framework for private securities litigation 
concerning misrepresentation or false disclosure. The PSL Rules address several issues 
concerning both the substance and procedure for private litigants bring a claim for 
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182 Governance Code, Section 13. 
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184 Securities Law, Article 63 (provides a basis for civil liability for disclosure fraud.) In addition the 
General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China Art. 213 (provide that tort victim are 
entitled to civil compensation).And CSRC, Notice on Issuing the Guideline on the Management of Listed 
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185 See generally Hutchens, supra note 7, at footnote 17.  
186 Supreme People’s Court, Notice Concerning Temporarily Not Accepting Civil Compensation Cases 
Related to Securities, September 21, 2001.  
187 Supreme People’s Court, Several Regulations Concerning the Adjudication of Civil Compensation 
Securities Cases Based upon Misrepresentation, Jan, 9 2003.  
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misrepresentation including who has standing, definition of the tort, statute of limitation, 
evidence requirements, and jurisdiction.188 
Under the PSL Rules Misrepresentations are defined as outright false statements, 
misleading statements, and material omission.189 The PSL however has important 
limitations on the scope of the tort. For instance plaintiffs may not recover when they buy 
a security prior to false disclosure and sell it prior to the time that the false disclosure is 
made public.190 
i. PSL and Insider Information 
The PSL rules limit private securities litigation to case for misrepresentation. The 
2001 ban on private causes of action remains in effect for insider trading and market 
manipulation cases.191 In fact. courts hearing cases of misrepresentation must separate 
damages caused by insider trading and market manipulation from those caused by 
misrepresentation and only allow for recover of damages caused by misrepresentation.192 
ii. PSL and the Government Enabling Requirement 
The PSL Rules require that before any private securities litigation suit may be 
brought in Chinese Courts there must be a prior administrative penalty or criminal 
penalty imposed on the defendant.193 This is referred to as the requirement of enabling 
government action. The requirement does not have a basis in any Chinese law concerning 
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189 PSL Rules, Art. 17.  
190 PSL Rules, Art. 19.  
191 See Wei, supra note 14, at 140.  
192 Id.  
193 PSL Rules, Art. 6.  
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securities but is rather more like a judge made legislation. This requirement can be met 
by a Chinese Court or any administrative agency with jurisdiction not just the CSRC.194 
Therefore there is a powerful government controlled gatekeeper on private securities 
litigation in Chinese courts.  
 
Part IIIF. Laws Governing SOE’s in the Market. 
This section examines the laws effecting SOE’s in the Chinese capital markets. 
Specifically it will focus on the laws affecting SASAC since they are likely to become 
the most influential players in the capital market. However, prior to discussing the these 
laws it will be useful to provide a brief background into the legal basis of state ownership 
in China.  
i. Legal Basis of State Ownership 
China’s Constitution strongly commits it is to socialist ideal of public ownership 
of the means of production.195 The Constitution names public ownership as the dominant 
force in the socialist economy and committees the State to ensuring the consolidation and 
growth of the State-owned economy.196 
The Constitution also recognizes private economies as major components of the 
socialist market economy.197 The State pledges itself to the protection of private sectors 
 
194 Id.   
195 Constitution, Article 6 (“The basis of the socialist economic system of the PRC is socialist public 
ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by 
the working people. The system of socialist public ownership supersedes the system of exploitation of man 
by man; it applies the principle of “from each according to his ability, to ach according to his work”).  
196 Constitution, Article 7 (“the State-owned economy, that is, the socialist economy under ownership by 
the whole people, is the leading force in the national economy. The State ensures the consolidation and 
growth of the State-owned economy.”).  
197 Constitution, Article 11(1).  
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of the economy and encourages, supports and guides their development.198 The 
Constitution also acknowledges private property as inviolable and commits the State to 
private property protection.199 The State may like many countries exercise eminent 
domain in the public interest provided it makes compensation.200 
ii. Laws Affecting State Owned Assets 
The organization with direct control over the most important state owned assets is 
the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). The 
primary law governing the SASAC is the Interim Regulations on Supervision and 
Management of State-owned Assets of Enterprises, which was adopted by the State 
Council in May of 2003.201 Under this law the SASAC is directly subordinate to the State 
Council and performs its functions on its behalf.202 
The SASAC was established to “suit the needs of the socialist market economy, 
better run State-owned enterprises, push forward the strategic adjustment of the layout 
and structure of the State economy, develop and expand the State economy, and realize 
the preservation of and increase the value of State-owned assets”.203 The SASAC 
therefore has traditional investor objectives as well as non-investor State objectives. 
 
iii. SASAC as Investor 
 
198 Constitution, Article 11(2). (“The State encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-
public sectors of the economy and, in accordance with law, exercises supervision and control over the non-
public sectors of the economy.”).  
199 Constitution, Article 13. 
200 Constitution, Article 13(3).  
201 Interim Regulations on Supervision and Management of State-owned Assets of Enterprises, adopted at 
the Eighth Executive Meeting of the State Council on May 13, 2003 (herinafter SASAC Regs,) 
202 SASAC Regs, Article 12 (which also notes that the SASAC is a specially established authority). 
203 SASAC Regs, Article 1.  
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A number of provisions of the SASAC Regulation make the SASAC conform to 
traditional investor objectives. The Regulations state that the SASAC shall not interfere 
with the independence of State-owned enterprise apart from performing the 
responsibilities of investor.204 In addition, The SASAC is to eliminate the functions of 
social and public administration formally assumed by the Peoples governments in their 
management of State-owned assets of enterprises.205 
The rights and responsibilities of the investor to which the SASAC must conform 
are set forth in the Company Law of China. These rights and responsibilities include 
enjoy capital gains, taking part in major policy decisions and choosing managers in 
proportion to share of the investment they make in the company.206 
iv. SASAC as More Than Investor 
In addition to performing the responsibilities of the typical investor the SASAC 
performs several additional functions. The SASAC has the power to formulate laws and 
regulations on its own which effect its management and the management by others in 
SOE’s.207 The SASAC has the power to broadly audit the financial and strategic positions 
of each of its state invested enterprises.208 The SASAC has the power to dispatch 
supervisory panels to the invested enterprises and punish and reward responsible persons 
 
204 SASAC Regs, Article 10 (“The SASAC shall support the independent operation of enterprises according 
to law, and shall not interfere in their production and operation activities, apart from performing the 
responsibilities of investor.”). 
205 SASAC Regs, Article 7 (Noting also that other institutions and departments under the government shall 
not perform the responsibilities of Investor of State-owned assets of enterprises).  
206 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, proglumated by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress on June 1, 1994 (revised 2004) Article 4.  
207 SASAC Regs Article 13.  
208 SASAC Regs, Article 13(5) (“supervise and administer the preservation of an increase in the value of 
State-owned assets of enterprises by means of statistics or auditing”. These audits and statistics gathering 
operations are quite extensive giving detailed insight to the SASAC of the financial situation and operation 
of the state invested enterprise); See The Measures for the Statistic Reports on State-owned Assets of 
Enterprises, promulgated by the State Council on February 2, 2004.   
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in the invested enterprise.209 It also has the authority to “undertake other tasks assigned to 
it by the government of the corresponding level”.210 
The SASAC has obligations in regard to state invested enterprises which 
supersede those of a typical investor. Such obligations include promoting the reasonable 
flow and optimized allocation of State-owned assets211, propel the adjustment of the 
layout and structure of the State economy212, and maintain and improve the controlling 
power and competitive power of the State economy in areas which have a vital bearing 
on the lifeline of the national economy and State security213. In general SASAC has the 
obligation to improve the overall quality of the State economy214.
It may accomplish these goals by offering “guidance and coordination” to State 
invested enterprises in “overcoming difficulties and solving problems” in their reform 
and development.215 In the event of wars, serous natural calamities or other “major and 
emergent situations”, the SASAC may uniformly reallocate and dispose State-owned 
assets of enterprises.216 These objectives obviously go beyond the privileges and 
responsibilities of the traditional investor.  
To shift gears a bit, the next section deals with the WTO. Considering the degree 
to which the Chinese government both directly and indirectly plays a role in the Chinese 
domestic markets it is necessary to determine whether its membership in the WTO 
subjects it to restrictions on that involvement.  
 
209 SASAC Regs, Article 13(3) (authority to dispatch supervisory panels; Article 13(4) authority to appoint, 
remove, punish, and reward responsible persons of the invested enterprise).  
210 SASAC Regs, Article 13(6) (this article appears somewhat vague but it does not seem to limit meddling 
by the government into the actions of the SASAC).  
211 SASAC Reg Article 14(1). 
212 Id.  
213 SASAC Reg Article 14(2). 
214 Id.  
215 SASAC Reg Article 14(6). 
216 SASAC Reg Article 9.  
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Part IIIG. WTO Rules on Subsidies 
One of the main goals of the WTO is to promote fair international trade by 
prohibiting member countries from granting subsidies to industries in their country. The 
major rules governing subsidies of WTO members is the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)217, which acts to supplement the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)218. In addition, the China Ascension Protocol 
contains several China specific rules concerning government subsidies for SOE’s.219 
Under WTO law a subsidy exists if there is a financial contribution by a 
government and a benefit is therefore conferred.220 A ‘financial contribution’ by the 
government includes direct transfers of money (grants, loans, or loan guarantees), non-
collection of money owned to the government (e.g. tax credits), goods or services 
provided by the government other than infrastructure, or purchase of goods by the 
government.221 In addition if a government provides funds for or entrusts a private body 
to engage in any of these financial contributions ‘which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed 
by governments’ it is considered a financial contribution by the government.222 
WTO is concerned primary with international trade in the import and export 
markets. The rules under GATT deal with subsidies generally as any form of income or 
 
217 WTO, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, (hereinafter SCM) 
218 WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (Hereinafter GATT) 
219 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 2001. 
(hereinafter Protocol).  
220 SCM, Article 1.1. 
221 SCM, Article 1.1(a)(1)(i-iii).  
222 SCM, Article 1.1(a)(2)(iv).  
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price support which operates directly or indirectly to increase any exports from the 
country or decrease any imports into its country.223 
There are generally two relevant exceptions to the subsidy prohibitions under the 
WTO agreement. They are the for subsidies granted by a developing country member in 
connection with a privatization program224 and those used by a transition economy 
member to facilitate its transformation from a centrally planned into a market 
economy.225 
However, under the China Protocol, China may not take advantage of the 
privatization exception.226 The transition exception also does not apply to China because 
it allows for a 7 year period to phase out such subsidies, a deadline which has already 
expired for China.227 Therefore there are no major exceptions under the WTO exempting 
China from government subsidies.  
Under GATT if a state enterprise or governments grants any exclusive or special 
privilege to an enterprise, such enterprises are required to make all sales and purchases of 
goods soley in accordance with non-discriminatory commercial considerations.228 
However there is a general provision for non-disclosure of confidential information if 
such information is contrary to public interest or would prejudice the legitimate 
commercial interests of particular enterprises.229 
The China Protocol however does include many China specific rules which were 
developed in the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China and 
 
223 GATT, Article XVI (A)(1).  
224 SCM, Article 27.13. 
225 SCM, Article 29,  
226 See Julia Ya Qin, WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises: A Critical Appraisal of the 
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incorporated into the China Protocol. The Protocol prevents SOE’s from making 
purchases and sales on anything other than commercial considerations.230 China must 
also ensure that other WTO members are allowed to compete in the market under non-
discriminatory basis.231 Further, the Government of China would not influence, directly 
or indirectly, commercial decisions on the part of SOE’s.232 
China must apply and administer all laws and regulations affecting trade in a 
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.233 Foreign individuals and enterprises must be 
accorded treatment no less favorable than any others on the prices and availability of 
goods and services supplied by public and state enterprises.234 
Part IV: Towards a New Paradigm and its Implications 
 
Part IVA: Application of Facts and Law 
In order to satisfy its citizens and thus retain its power the CCP is necessarily 
becoming increasingly concerned with wealth. It may be argued that this pragmatic 
approach may be the best way for China to proceed in order to ensure social stability.235 
It does not take much to envision the human travesty that would occur if wide scale social 
instability broke out in China due to botched market reforms. Along the same line it’s 
important for China and the world to prevent China from becoming an arguably failed 
capitalist state like Russia.  
 
230 Protocol, Article 9(1). 
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233 Protocol, Article 2(A)1. 
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235 See Peerenboom, supra note 15 (the article makes the point that countries in east Asia that are more 
restrictive of political and human rights while the government pursues economic reforms outside the 
control of an effective rule of law, are more successful in the long the run).   
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However, the money that the CCP needs to prevent this social instability is in 
large part generated through international trade, domestic markets, and foreign direct and 
indirect investment. When China competes with other countries in the global market 
there will surely be losers if China does not play fair. Therefore while the pragmatic 
approach may be the most efficient for China it could have seriously unfair effects on 
competing countries. 
i. China’s Domestic Securities Markets 
Recent reforms in the Chinese Securities Markets appear to be decreasing the 
power of the State over the market, but are in fact actually creating a more flexible and 
powerful means for the government to unfairly benefit at the use of its markets. The 
classification of shares based on the origins of ownership and the split share reform are 
two very subtle methods which combined actually increase the State’s unfair advantage 
in the market.  
a. Classification of Stocks 
 The classification of stocks based on ownership has the effect of keeping a large 
number of foreign investors from participating in China’s securities markets. Absent 
large QFII’s and other special international investors which are allowed to trade in A 
Shares, the rest of the outside world is restricted to B shares which have an intrinsically 
lower value and are very rarely offered by Chinese companies.236 This has the effect of 
excluding the vast majority of the world’s investors from the Chinese market.237 
The exclusion of smaller foreign investors from the Chinese market is actually 
advantageous to the government for at least two reasons. First, China is able to avoid 
 
236 See Infra, footnotes 94-99 and accompanying text.  
237 See Gao, supra note 46 at 11-14.  
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strict scrutiny over unfair practices in its markets. While China has complete control over 
its domestic press, it could not prevent international investors who were aggrieved by the 
situation of unfair market practices and lax enforcement to openly criticize and expose 
the Chinese government’s role.238 
The classification of stocks and the restrictions limit foreign investors to large 
institutional investors. These investors are very sophisticated and successful investors 
who are capable of obtaining sufficient information to make wise investment choices in 
Chinese companies. However, smaller, less sophisticated investors would be more likely 
to make unwise investment choices and be harmed as a result. The cry of injustice from 
this multitude of ‘little guy’ investors would attract more public sympathy and pressure 
their governments to confront China about its unfair domestic markets. This is a situation 
that China’s stock classification effectively avoids.  
Secondly, by largely restricting the domestic market, China is preventing 
foreigners from taking strategic stakes in the Chinese economy.239 This appears to be a 
method the Chinese government is using as evidenced by its $711 billion dollar stake 
directly in the US government through debt. Such a strategic stake is beneficial to the 
Chinese government because the threat of calling in debts and the desire of countries like 
the US to borrow more money likely has the effect of chilling attempts to openly criticize 
 
238 This also prevents domestic actors from learning about successful foreign strategies to achieve justice, 
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unfair trade practices of the Chinese government or their support of human rights abuses 
and alliances with terrorist states.240 
In addition it provides a security blanket for the activities of Chinese companies 
since they are insulted from the rest of the world by complete ownership of their strategic 
industries. There is little threat foreign investment could inadvertently reveal sensitive 
national security plans within China, such as how the massive amounts of spending on 
the military is being utilized through domestic contracts.241 
b. Split Share Reform 
 The split share reform program has the effect of streamlining the governments 
internal investment and making strategic acquisitions and sales easier for the government. 
Since the government is no longer constrained by rules which require it to retain large 
shares of un-profitable companies the government is able to shed these companies and 
reinvest their money in more profitable companies and thus increase their control over 
important industries and increase revenue. Such a practice does not in itself seem unfair 
as long as the Chinese government does not use it to create an unfair advantage in the 
market.  
What the split share reform has essentially accomplished is allow much greater 
flexibility to the Chinese government to participate in the market. This flexibility only 
makes the Chinese governments participation more efficient, which is of course the goal. 
 
240 Id. ( noting how developed countries are increasingly conditioning aid to developing countries as a 
method of promoting the developing countries willingness to enact legal reforms.) China has in effect 
reversed this tactic on the US, by not requiring aid and instead holding massive amounts of US securities, 
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241 See Philip Pan, In China Rumsfeld Urges Greater Global Role, Freedom, Military Candor, Washington 
Post (October 19, 2005) available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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It should be noted that in companies that really matter, the same ones the government is 
holding unto or increasing its stake in, there is no benefit to the shareholders since the 
management structure of these companies will remain unchanged. Thus saying that the 
program is a market reform intended to benefit the shareholders would be inaccurate.  
c. CSRC 
The CSRC is hugely ineffective when it comes to dealing with abuses by SOE’s 
in the market. The CSRC and SOE’s have the same boss, the State Council and 
ultimately the CCP. The CSRC is very much unlikely going to investigate or discipline 
large SOE’s because it would in fact be disciplining itself. This situation is further 
aggrieved by the State’s complete control over the personnel and budge of the CSRC 
which are both inadequate to effectively regulation all of China’s listed companies.  
The Chinese government is subtle about reigning in the CSRC due to its public 
role of investor protection. For instance the government would decrease the CSRC’s 
already sorely under funded budget because that would be an obvious indication to the 
public that the governments priority is not really the shareholders protection. However, 
the government through its control of the media is able to make scapegoats out of 
enforcement friendly CSRC personnel and have them removed such as the case of 
director Zhou in 2002. Through actions such as these the Government is able to minimize 
the enforcement role of the CSRC.  
 
d. SASAC 
The SASAC is a very powerful tool of the government in increasing its control 
over the market. The SASAC is the centralized owner over the largest and most 
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important SOE’s in China reporting directly to the State. This consolidation has created a 
more loyal servant to the government by cutting out the provincial or military owners 
which might have objectives that differ from the central government.  
The SASAC also has the very powerful affect of concerted action. Sitting at the 
top of the most important industries in China the SASAC is able to have significant 
control over supply chains, certain markets, and other economic factors that can be 
affected by a network of enormous enterprises acting in concert. This advantage has the 
effect of making sure that SASAC companies have a dominant market position. Of 
course this is the purpose of the SASAC.242 However, this also has the effect of greatly 
distorting the domestic market.  
The SASAC is also a central clearing house of information about the companies it 
owns. All the companies that the SASAC owns provide it with detailed financial 
information which would normally only be available to a purely public organization like 
the CSRC. This information is powerful because it allows the SASAC to gauge the 
performance of huge market players prior to the time that anyone has this information.  
With the split share reform the SASAC is now free to trade on this information. 
For example, the SASAC could obtain information from one its mining companies that a 
large deposit of copper has been discovered thus driving down the price of copper. The 
SASAC could then increase its investment in any company which the state has significant 
investment in that really heavily on the use of cooper such as a electric wire manufacturer 
whose shares are likely to increase in value due to the decline in the price of copper. Or 
the SASAC could obtain information concerning important political or economic moves 
 
242 See Infra, footnotes 211-214 and accompanying text.  
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soon to be made by the government concerning certain sectors of the economy and trade 
on that information.  
 
e. Courts 
Even if the CSRC found violations of SOE’s in the market there would be little 
redress due to the fact that the courts are controlled by and defer to the government. It is 
highly unlikely that the Courts are going to discipline SOE’s because the governments 
that own them also in effect own the Courts.  
The Courts have already gone along with the government on stopping one of the 
most effective means of market regulation, private securities litigation. While the Courts 
have recently created civil liability for misrepresentation, there are currently no civil torts 
for breach of fiduciary duty and insider information.  
The lack of private securities litigation serves the government in other ways as 
well. There is a cultural disconnect with the adversarial process that could be borne 
directly out of the CCP’s fear of social unrest.243 This fear of unrest is a good candidate 
for limitation of private actors suing companies which are largely controlled by the state, 
and of increasing regulation which could expose not only the state companies themselves 
to liability but also to expose the system of economic control held by the CCP.  
f. The Torts 
1. Duty of Care 
 
243 See Hutchens, supra note 7, at 645 (while discussing PSL and the implications that it would have for the 
development of class action suits, one Supreme People’s Court judge said “the word ‘class’… is in the 
name of this legal device. You are going to get all the angry shareholders organized in one class. That is 
politically too dangerous”) 
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The Chinese government has not been encouraging making breach of fiduciary 
duties an actionable violation of the law. This is because the fiduciary duty in China’s 
SOE’s is not really to the shareholders but rather to the State, which could have very 
different investment objectives considering it’s vast market control and ability to leverage 
companies against each other.  
In addition the SASAC and other state actors such as local governments have an 
inherent conflict of interest between their different holdings. For example the SASAC 
may have control of the two competing mining companies. With directors on boards of 
these two companies the SASAC would likely be less willing to compete with each in a 
market environment to secure a certain assets such as government contracts. This would 
stagnant the share price as neither company bet the other in bidding on the asset which 
would have the effect of increasing share price.   
The recent attempts by the CSRC to define the fiduciary duties in the Governance 
Code are inadequate. First of all there is little to no real disciplinary measures set out in 
the Governance Code. This is a fact that will likely be recognized by the Courts when 
they refuse to hear cases based on breach of fiduciary duty. In addition the duties 
themselves are very vague. In the Civil Law system defining these duties in a statute is an 
almost impossible task and courts as well as the CSRC will have little to no direction 
when determining whether certain actions of SOE’s constitute a breach of fiduciary 
duties.  
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2. Insider Information 
With large state shareholders such as the SASAC and local governments having 
several different holdings the availability of inside information to these organizations is 
inherent.  For example two companies competing on a contract would likely be aware of 
the position of the other company. There is nothing preventing local governments or the 
SASAC from exchanging this information between the two. There are no laws saying that 
the SASAC can not exchange information learned in one of its companies with another. 
The insider trading law does not seem to include the SASAC under its definition of who 
can have inside information. This complete lack of regulation concerning insider 
information in the laws governing the SASAC indicates that the government is not 
prepared to limit these companies from exchanging insider information.  
 
ii. WTO 
There are several aspects of the Chinese capital markets which could be 
considered violations of China’s WTO agreements. For example, in affect the SASAC is 
a government subsidy since the Government is providing goods and services in the way 
of facilities and manpower to SOE’s in order to boost their competitiveness. The Chinese 
government established the SASAC, has oversight over it, and provides for its funding 
and infrastructure. The SASAC has definitely conferred a benefit to the companies under 
there control as evidenced by their increase in market value.  
In the abstract a regulatory regime that is conducive to Insider information 
violations could be considered a subsidy. Indirectly permitting SOE’s to trade on insider 
information due to the lax regulatory framework to prevent it can allow for benefits 
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between domestic companies that distort trade with international companies competing in 
the domestic market. By allowing for, or at least not effectively regulating, insider 
information the Chinese government is allowing indirectly a benefit to be conferred on 
the domestic industries. This constitutes a financial contribution indirectly because it 
allows the SOE’s to use inside information to increase their share price just as sure as if 
the government had given them the extra money themselves.  
In sum, these perceived legal inadequacies in China’s securities market regulation 
which in effect benefit the Government both economically and politically calls for a 
paradigm shift to assessing the China securities market reforms based on their actual 
intended objectives.  
 
Part IVB: New Paradigm244 
The paradigm of suggesting that increasingly the amount of western-styled 
reforms into the Chinese securities regulation framework simply does not work, because 
it is based on a misconception about what the Chinese securities market really is and 
what recent reforms are intended to accomplish. This article has attempted to show that 
the Chinese securities market is nothing like a real securities market but is rather a 
mechanism controlled by the Chinese government in order to increase its own revenue 
and allow it to compete more effectively on the global market. In effect it is a 
government piggy bank.  
 
244 This attempt at formulating a new paradigm for analysis of Chinese capital market reforms is admittedly 
greatly simplified and incomplete. However, see KUHN, supra note 4 at 156 (“The early versions of most 
new paradigms are crude. By the time their full aesthetic appeal can be developed, most of the community 
has been persuaded by other means. Nevertheless, the importance of aesthetic considerations can 
sometimes be decisive”). After all, Id. at 158 (“Something must make a least a few scientist feel that the 
new proposal is on the right track, and sometimes it is only personal and inarticulate aesthetic 
considerations that can do that”)  
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The traditional conception of a securities market is as a mechanism whereby 
capital can be most effectively raised and distributed to the most effective corporations 
with the benefit going to the shareholder. The traditional market is regulated by an un-
interested third party that seeks no benefit within the market for itself. Under these 
conditions incorporating corporate governance mechanisms like fiduciary duties and 
strict prohibition against insider trading can and are usually effective. However this is not 
what the Chinese securities market is.  
The Chinese securities market is a mechanism whereby capital can be most 
effectively raised and distributed for the benefit of the government. The communist 
government in China claims to hold all its assets in the name of the people under the 
constitution. This makes government ownership and prosperity a national priority to 
which individual gain is subjected.245 In this type of market objecting to the government 
prospering at the expense of the individual shareholders is not tolerated.  
Referring to the primary motivators of money and power discussed earlier, these 
motivators shed a great deal of light on the Chinese securities market. The Chinese 
government is seeking both essential power and money from its involvement in the 
securities market. It is seeking power by establishing an insolated securities market which 
is not foreign investor friendly in order to prevent the same market leverage it has used 
against countries like the US from being used on itself.  
 
245 See Van Hoecke, supra note 5, at 593 (Discussing who western legal cultures are different in the aspect 
that they are defined by individualism“ By individualism what is meant is a belief in the autonomy and 
total liberty of the individual in, and possibly against, society. This conception is diametrically opposed to 
the notion of collectivism, or the idea of the submission of the individual to the community. Here, the 
individual is considered to be unable to live or develop without being related to his or her society. From 
this premise even individual liberty is subordinated to the interest of society. Community life based on free 
will is contrary to a community life imposed or perceived as evident”.). 
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The Chinese government’s motivations for seeking money from the securities 
markets are numerous. For one they simply wish to cut the cost of providing social 
benefits to the populace. By having an effective control over the supply side of the 
economy the government can reduce its cost through defeating competition which would 
increase the costs of goods and services it is required to provide its citizens. Secondly the 
government is promoting national security by giving it the money it needs to ensure that 
it will be an effective competitor in international markets for such critical goods as oil. 
Thirdly it is attempting to prevent civil unrest and provide jobs for its citizens.   
 The Chinese securities market than is a government piggy bank whose proceeds 
are used in the national interest in order to promote social stability and keep the CCP in 
power. This reflects major differences with western markets based on a fundamental 
ideological difference.  
In Western countries, capital markets exist for the benefit of the corporation and 
ultimately for the shareholder, who uses his share value to presumably increase the 
quality of life and pay for the basic necessities. In China, capital markets exist for the 
benefit of the corporation, particularly ones owned by the government, and ultimately for 
the government itself, who uses its share value to increase the quality of life for all 
citizens and pay for their basic necessities.  Viewed from this perspective, critical 
analysis of laws affecting Chinese securities markets should shift dramatically.  
 
Part IVC. Suggestions Based on New Paradigm 
Viewing the legal framework of Chinese capital markets through this new 
paradigm minimizes the effectiveness of advocating for the adoption of Western style 
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reforms in Chinese capital markets. The Chinese government is well aware of how 
foreign markets work and likely know exactly what they could do to make theirs a fair 
and equal market. However, they have not done so, because there is no will to do it. This 
leaves the paradigm of suggesting western ways to make the market more fair and equal 
in shatters. 
 Since the Chinese government is using its domestic markets to increase its 
competitiveness in the international market and likely has no desire to fix its market, 
because it would hurt the interest of the Government, options for effective regulation to 
prevent an unfair advantage in international trade might have to come from outside of 
China.  
The easiest way to impact unfair competition in Chinese domestic markets is 
investigation and education. Little research has been done on the Chinese government’s 
direct influence in its domestic markets through actual participation. Of course, this 
information is terribly difficult to come by due to the fact that the Chinese government is 
able to partially restrict the freedom of press and is certainly not going to be willing to 
detail its unfair market involvements. Another reason this information is so hard to get is 
the lack of information made available to researchers in foreign languages. However, 
empirical evidence must be obtained otherwise mere speculation regarding unfair 
practices will never induce correction.246 
There are two additional ways that outside influences might effectively correct 
the Chinese domestic market; international organizations and direct investment 
restrictions imposed by individual foreign governments. The default candidate for a 
 
246 See KUHN, supra note 4, at 87 (“Since no experiment can be conceived without some sort of theory, the 
scientist in crisis will constantly try to generate speculative theories that, if successful, may disclose the 
road to a new paradigm and , if unsuccessful, can be surrendered with relative ease.”).  
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corrective international organization is the WTO which is the only international body 
with a dispute resolution mechanism. Actions could be initiated at the WTO to 
investigate the distortion in the Chinese market and how that gives China an unfair trade 
advantage over other nations. Specifically, the WTO could recognize that Chinese lax 
enforcement and participation through organizations like the SASAC constitute a 
government subsidy. This would allow other countries to take countervailing measures 
against Chinese goods and thus force the Chinese government to adopt a different 
strategy for increasing its competitiveness.  
However, there are serious flaws with the WTO system which would likely 
prevent such a large scale effort against one of the most power economic countries on the 
planet.247 The scope of the problems with WTO enforcement is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, it is possible that even if the WTO were to initiate enforcement in 
certain instances, it is possible that China’s economic partners would ignore WTO 
regulations of China in exchange for beneficial trade agreements, the type of which the 
WTO is met to prevent.  
Another method to counter China’s unfair market practices would domestic 
divestment campaigns. A couple of US states have already passed legislation prohibiting 
public pension funds from investing in companies deal with terrorist sponsoring 
countries.248 Such measures have been taken in the past against countries like South 
 
247 See Sheehy, supra note 16, at 227 (noting that the WTO dispute resolution mechanism is “long, drawn 
out, and requires high-level government involvement”). And at 262 (“it seems unwise to rely on reforms 
promised under the conditions of accession to the WTO given that the WTO is a matter of national 
government and policy. Such being the case, these WTO commitments are not likely to have a bearing on 
individual private enterprise or to address matters of credibility necessary in specific litigation or disputed 
matters.”).  
248 See Gaffney, supra note 49.   
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Africa during apartheid.249 Of course to have any real impact on China’s domestic market 
such campaign would have to greatly increase in scope to include such things as aiding 
human rights abuses or unfair market activities which detrimentally affect the US 
economy.  
While there is no obvious solution to the problem of China’s inadequate capital 
market regulation these meager solutions are intended to invoke a sense of how legal 
scholars can view solutions to Chinese legal reforms as viewed through the new 
paradigm.  
Conclusion 
This article has attempted to make the case for a paradigm shift from viewing 
Chinese capital markets as in need of better Western style reforms to China’s 
unwillingness and inability to pursue such reforms as evidenced by the current 
intentionally unfair legal framework. With this paradigm shift comes new implications 
for future legal analysis of Chinese domestic capital markets.  
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